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ABSTRACT 
 
GREEK POLICIES TOWARDS TURKEY  
WITHIN THE EU FRAMEWORK 
 
ÖZTÜRK, DUYGU 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
May 2008 
 
 
This thesis examines Greek policies towards Turkey with an emphasis on the effect 
of Greece’s membership to the European Union. The research question is how 
EC/EU membership was used by Greece in the bilateral relations with Turkey. The 
focus period is from Greece’s gaining of membership status in 1981 until the 
Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Turkey was granted candidate status for EU 
membership. For a thorough understanding of the period, the period by the end of 
the Second World War until 1981 is also examined in terms of Greek foreign and 
defense policies, Greece-EC relations and relations with Turkey. This work 
represents the usage of EU membership by Greece as a bargaining power in its 
relations with Turkey for solution of the disputes.  
 
Key Words: Greek Foreign and Defense Policy, Turkish-Greek relations, 
PASOK, Cyprus, Aegean disputes, Greece-EU relations, Turkey-EU relations.  
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ÖZET 
 
AB ÇERÇEVESİNDE YUNANİSTAN’IN  
TÜRKİYE’YE KARŞI İZLEDİĞİ POLİTİKALAR 
 
 
ÖZTÜRK, DUYGU 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
Mayıs 2008 
 
 
Bu tez Yunanistan’ın Türkiye’ye karşı izlediği politikaları, Yunanistan’ın Avrupa 
Birliği üyeliğinin etkileri üzerinde durarak incelemektedir. Araştırma sorusu 
AT/AB üyeliğinin Yunanistan tarafından Türkiye ile olan ikili ilişkilerde nasıl 
kullanıldığıdır. Odaklanılan zaman dilimi 1981’de Yunanistan’ın adaylık statüsü 
kazanmasından Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği için aday gösterildiği 1999 Helsinki 
Zirvesine kadardır. Bu dönemin derinlemesine anlaşılması için İkinci Dünya 
Savaşı’ndan 1981’e kadar olan zaman dilimi de Yunan dış ve güvenlik politikaları, 
Yunanistan-AT ilişkileri ve Türkiye’yle ilişkileri açısından incelenmektedir. Bu 
çalışma, AB üyeliğinin Yunanistan tarafından Türkiye ile olan ikili ilişkilerdeki 
sorunların çözümünde pazarlık unsuru olarak kullanıldığını göstermektedir.   
  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yunan Dış ve Güvenlik Politikaları, Türk-Yunan 
İlişkileri, PASOK, Kıbrıs, Ege Sorunları, Yunanistan-AB İlişkileri, Türkiye-
AB İlişkileri. 
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 CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, various factors have been affecting and 
shaping the foreign and defense policies of Greece. Among those factors Turkey 
has always had a place sometimes as the main center of threat and sometimes as a 
‘compulsory’ ally under common threats; but almost all the time appeared at the 
top of Greek foreign policy agenda.  
The aim of the research is to bring explanations to the question of how 
EC/EU membership was used by Greece in the bilateral relations with Turkey. 
While the research was inspired with this question, the outcomes of the research 
are shown in the thesis in a way to reflect both the role of Turkey or the ‘Turkish 
threat’ on the formation of Greek foreign and defense policies with a special 
emphasis on Greece’s relations with the European Union, and how Turkish-Greek 
relations, or Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue were affected by Greece’s 
membership to the Union.    
The methodology of the research is qualitative because of the characteristic 
of the main question asked, though some means of quantitative research methods 
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like statistical data were used when they were seen useful for making a better 
understanding. The main sources of the research were various primary sources 
such as speeches of politicians, official documents like agreements, treaties and 
European Union (EU) Commission Reports and Council Conclusions, and 
secondary sources of articles, books, and newspapers. 
The thesis consists of four main chapters. However, the first two chapters 
are introductory chapters of the subsequent ones making a basis for a better 
understanding of Greece’s policies within the EU towards Turkey. It was aimed in 
the first chapter to explain political and economic reasons behind Greece’s first 
steps taken closer to European Community (EC). What the main factors behind the 
formation of Greek foreign and defense policies were by the end of the Second 
World War, the driving forces behind the application of Association membership 
and why these kinds of relations were chosen instead of membership to the 
Community are the main questions. Besides, Greece’s relations with Turkey during 
the 1950s is analyzed with an emphasis on the break out of the Cyprus crisis and 
whether Turkey had any affect on Greece’s signing of Association Agreement is 
discussed.  
In the second chapter, the main aim is to provide an understanding of the 
Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue which broke out again in the 1970s. These 
two issues had the power to direct the progress of the relations in the next decades. 
Instead of bringing one-sided arguments on the issues and day by day development 
of the disputes, it is aimed to demonstrate the reasons why those issues became 
disputes between the two countries. This point is important to understand the 
positions of Greece and Turkey in the coming years and the Greek perception of 
 2
Turkey as the ‘main threat’ to its existence for more than two decades. It is worth 
to state that the expression of ‘relations’ was almost a synonym of the expression 
of ‘disputes’ in Turkish-Greek relations until the last continuing rapprochement 
since 1999.  
In the third chapter, the ten years of Greek membership in the EC/EU was 
analyzed in two sub-titles. Firstly, the reasons behind Greek application for 
membership are analyzed and the perception of Turkey as ‘the main threat’ among 
the reasons is emphasized. Turkey’s reaction to Greece’s membership to the 
Community is discussed in-depth since it reflects the first estimations about the 
way Turkish-Greek relations would be affected in the following years. Under the 
second sub-title, Greek foreign policy of the 1980s with an emphasis on the 
‘Turkish threat’ and Turkey’s application for EC membership, the reasons and 
outcomes it brought are analyzed. The changes in domestic political scene in 
Greece and Turkey and their foreign policy aims are also discussed since they 
formed the main reasons behind policies. Also, the striking facts of the period, the 
1987 crisis and Davos process were analyzed. This chapter is important to show 
how EC membership was used by PASOK against Turkey during the 1980s in 
order to solve the disputes between them. It is argued that EC membership was 
used by Greece as an obstructive factor by the usage of its veto power to prevent 
the development of Turkey’s relations with the community and the regular 
implementation of the Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol. Turkey had to 
face the Greece obstacle in its relations with the EC. 
In the last chapter of the thesis it is aimed to analyze Greece’s policies 
during the 1990s with a focus on its relations/disputes with Turkey and how the EC 
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continued to be affective in bilateral relations. Because of the crucial change in the 
standing of PASOK with Simitis, the period is analyzed in two main parts. In the 
first part, the main reasons behind the formation of post-Cold War Greek foreign 
and defense policies with existence of new threats and relations with Turkey 
during the first half of the 1990s under the influence of the EU and Cyprus issue 
are analyzed. The reasons and political outcomes of signing the Customs Union 
between Turkey and the EC regarding Cyprus, and the policy of Greece during this 
process are the issues discussed. In the second part of the last chapter, three years, 
1996-1999, were put under scrutiny. Even tough it is a very short time in the lives 
of states, vital changes happened in PASOK which deeply affected the vision of 
the party. With Simitis, Greece started to follow more constructive policies 
towards the Balkan countries and Turkey. The reasons behind those policies and 
how they were reflected in the disputes with Turkey are discussed. In addition, the 
main disputes, Kardak/Imia, S-300 and Ocalan crises along with the EU 
Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits are analyzed since they were intertwined 
within the Turkey-Greece-EU triangle.  
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 CHAPTER 2  
 
 
GREEK FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES AFTER THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to analyze Greek foreign and defense policy since the end of the 
Second World War until the 1970s. Within this general framework, the main focus 
will be on Greece’s relations with the European Community (EC) and Turkey.  
Firstly, Greek foreign and defense policy determinants and aims will be analyzed. 
The communist threat for Greece, relations with the United States of America 
(USA) and its NATO membership will be looked over. The reasons of why Greece 
chose Associate Membership in EC, provisions and objectives of the Association 
Agreement will be explained. In terms of relations with Turkey, the focus will be 
on general course of the relations under the Cold War conditions, and the outbreak 
and solution of Cyprus problem. 
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2.1 Reasons Behind the Greek Application for Associate Membership in EC 
 
2.1.1 Post–war Greek Policies and NATO Membership 
The Greek journey on the way of the EU membership started on June 8, 1959 
“when Greece became the first country to apply for an Association Agreement 
with the European Economic Community”.1 Signing of the Association Agreement 
came at the end of a period because of economic, political and security reasons 
rooted in the first decade of the Cold War Era and psychological instigations 
growing out of European identity.  
When the Second World War broke out in Europe, the aim of Greek 
dictator Ioannis Metaksas was to keep the country out of it.2 Metaksas was not 
successful in realizing this aim and Greece found itself at war by the invasion of 
Italian forces in October 1940. In a short time, all of Greece was under Axis 
occupation.3 The fate of Greece was changed by strong Greek communist guerilla 
fighters and intense British military involvement and aid. However, the strength of 
the communists, led to a civil war which had roots reaching 1941 and increased its 
tension by 1944.4 During 1944-1949, Greece suffered a bloody, socially and 
                                                 
1 Susannah Verney, “Greece and the European Community,” in Political Change in Greece: Before 
and After the Colonels, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (London: Croom Helm, 
1987), 253. 
2 Richard Clogg, Modern Yunanistan Tarihi, trans. Dilek Şendil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), 
149. 
3 Bulgaria took Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Albanians took the northern part of Epirus, 
Germans occupied Athens, Salonika, the province of Evros on the Turkish frontier, Crete and some 
other islands, and the rest of the country was left to Italian occupation, for details see, L. S. 
Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), 785. 
4 The Greek Civil War which is generally explained in two phases had the seed in the years when 
the Greek Communist Party (KKE) created National Liberation Front (EAM) and its armed wing 
Greek People’s Liberation Army in late 1941. ELAS forces fought along with the British forces 
against Axis occupation. EAM and ELAS had two major aims: first to save Greece from Axis 
occupation, and then establish a regime close to Moscow. With these political aims and military 
power of 60,000 fighters, Greece lived the most destructive war of its history for the regime to be 
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economically destructive civil war which is mostly defined as the first battleground 
of the Cold War. After the civil war, Athens could not focus on economic and 
social recovery programs. During the 1950s, its priority was to be secure against 
communism. Since Greece did not have enough political, economic or military 
power and capacity to resist against such a worldwide communist threat alone, it 
succeeded in saving its territorial integrity and regime with bilateral or multilateral 
alliances and cooperations. Moreover the first steps for long term policies 
concerning EU membership could be taken.  
Against the communist threat, the main power to provide economic and 
military aid and assistance to Greece was no one else but USA. Since the civil war, 
Greek security was identified with American defense policy and Greek forces were 
exclusively equipped with American arms.5 It was a situation which served both 
American and Greek defense and foreign policies within the new international 
environment against communism. For Greece, involvement of a great power to its 
domestic and foreign policies was not a new situation. From the time of 
establishment in the 19th century, Greece had lived through foreign intervention 
and dependence and formed its policy priorities in accommodation to great power 
policies in a broader policy framework. Van Coufoudakis finds the reason for this 
situation in the strategic location, vulnerable military, weak finance, and in the 
                                                                                                                                       
established after the Second World War. For detailed information about Greek Civil War see, 
Dominique Eudes, Kapetanios Yunan İç Savaşı 1943–1949, trans. Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: Belge 
Yayınları, 1995); Richard Clogg, Modern Yunanistan Tarihi, trans. Dilek Şendil (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 1997); John Newsinger, “Churchill, Stalin and the Greek Revolution,” Monthly Review 
(April 1999); “Greek Civil War,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/greek.htm 
(accessed May 9, 2008). 
5 Thanos Veremis, Greek Security Considerations A Historical Perspective, Athens, Papazissis 
Publishers, 1982, p. 79.  
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unstable politics of Greece.6 From time to time Greece could turn this situation to 
its advantage on the issues where it could not be effective alone as a small-state 
and sometimes had to suffer from foreign interventions and dependence when there 
was a contradiction between its small-state interests and great power interests. 
After the end of the Second World War, Greece was in a situation supporting the 
former argument, in that it was seeking foreign intervention and dependence 
against the communist threat which it was not able resist alone. 
It was not a situation that Greece chose United States as ‘the big brother’ to 
protect itself from a possible Communist attack from the north and to help it in 
economic recovery. The Cold War conditions, the change in British policies 
concerning Greece and Turkey, and the new Truman administration in the USA 
opened the way for active American involvement in the regions. Until the last 
months of the Second World War, the USA was following a policy of isolation and 
disinterest in the territories which were miles and seas away from the American 
mainland. This situation was changed with the existence of a bipolar international 
system which defined the security perceptions and defense policies of states in the 
new international environment. In addition to that, the leadership of President 
Harry S. Truman in the reconstruction of new US foreign and defense policies 
cannot be ignored. Until Truman’s presidency, the USA showed neither serious 
interest nor any involvement in Greek politics. This foreign policy of the US can 
be explained by its general pre-war isolation policy, pre-war American security 
spheres and threat perceptions, and last but not the least the heavy British influence 
                                                 
6  Van Coufoudakis, “Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1965: Seeking Independence in an 
Interdependent World – Problems and Prospects,” in Political Change in Greece: Before and After 
the Colonels, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 
230. 
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and involvement in Greece. Greece was under much British influence and 
involvement in domestic and foreign politics from the day of its establishment 
since the 19th century. This situation also continued during the Second World War. 
The USA was pleased with the situation that the Middle East and Mediterranean 
were under the control and backing of a friendly state. However, this situation in 
the USA left its place to uneasiness in the diplomatic circles and in public opinion 
towards the end of the war when a power struggle appeared between the British 
military forces and Greek communist guerilla fighters about the regime to be 
established after the war. The Secretary of State Edward Stettiniues expressed this 
uneasiness in a statement broadcast over the Voice of America: 
US policy has always been to refrain from any interference in the 
internal affairs of the other nations (…) US will make no attempt to 
influence the composition of any government in any friendly country. 
The American people have naturally viewed with sympathy the 
aspirations of the resistance movements and the anti-fascist elements 
in liberated countries.7
 
In addition to this declaration, the State Department informed President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt that “American opinion was shocked by the spectacle of 
armed conflict between the British and the Greeks and strongly reacted against 
British action”.8 However, this point of view did not last long. In the peace 
conferences it was understood that the Soviet-American cooperation could not 
continue more in a world where their interests had started to clash.  
The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 and the Presidency of Harry 
S. Truman marked the beginning of a new phase in American foreign and defense 
policy understanding along with the developments in 1945 and 1946. Most of the 
                                                 
7  Quoted in John O. Iatrides and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, “International Dimension of the Greek 
Civil War,” World Policy Journal (March 22, 2000): 94-95. 
8 Iatrides and Rizopoulos, 95. 
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policy makers of Truman administration were convinced by the developments in 
East Europe and the Middle East that “the Soviet Union was indeed pursuing a 
policy of global expansion which had to be opposed by the US”.9 In addition to the 
Soviet threat and redefinition of security spheres of the US, in February 1947, the 
British announcement that it could no longer provide economic and military 
support to Greece and Turkey forced the USA to adopt an active foreign policy. 
Within those circumstances, President Truman did not wait to show American 
economic, political and military support to Greece and Turkey and to other non-
communist countries with his Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948. 
With the Truman Doctrine, which came out as a result of Truman’s speech in the 
Congress on March 12, 1947, the Congress allocated $400 million in aid to Greece 
and Turkey, and military assistance for postwar construction.10 Even though it was 
an economic and military aid, the outcomes of it for Greece and Turkey were much 
more. For both of the countries, it was a kind of proof that the US had taken them 
within its security zone. From the Greek point of view, the Truman Doctrine meant 
that a new breath of life would be blown into the tiring government’s efforts to 
prevent Greece from becoming communist.11 Economic aid and military assistance 
to Greece under the Truman Doctrine became the key factor of victory against 
communist guerilla fighters in 1949 with the undeniable effect of Tito’s policy of 
closing Yugoslavia’s borders to communist guerillas. 
                                                 
9 Theodokis Karvounarakis, “In Defense of <<Free Peoples>>: The Truman Doctrine and its 
Impacts on Greece during the Civil War Years, 1947-1949,” 
http://www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/files/op0106.PDF (accessed October 25, 2007), 5. 
10 $300 million of this aid was allocated for Greece because of the civil war situation in the country 
and $100 million was left for Turkey. For the speech of President Truman in the Congress known 
as Truman Doctrine, see http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/03/documents/truman/ 
(accessed September 21, 2007).   
11 Theodore Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 27.    
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Truman Doctrine was followed by Marshall Plan in 1948. Marshall Plan 
was more comprehensive in terms of states included and more limited in terms of 
issues covered. It was an economic aid to European countries to strengthen their 
economies, help their post-war repairing process and provide solidarity among 
them. With this Plan, the US aimed to bring an accelerating economic and political 
cooperation with the European countries and stop the Soviet expansion in 
Europe.12   
With the ad hoc American economic and military aid and political support, 
Greece could feel secured against communism up to a certain point. There was no 
official guarantee for the continuation of American backing in case of a communist 
attack. This uncertainty left a vacuum to be covered in the defense policy of the 
country. For this reason, Greece was searching for possibilities of permanent 
regional alliances against communist attack. Within this policy, Turkey which 
would be the main source of threat starting in the late 1960s, was taken as a 
militarily powerful, friendly state suffering from the same threat and proceeding on 
the same way with Greece in terms of defense and foreign politics. A military 
alliance with Turkey would make Greece feel more secure since it would not have 
to increase its armed forces to meet the alarming environment at the expense of its 
economy by sharing the costs with Turkey. Greece gave voice to this intention in 
Paris in March 1948 when Greek and Turkish representatives came together for the 
European Recovery Programme. Greek deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Constantine Tsaldaris approached Turkish ambassador to Athens 
                                                 
12 Çağrı Erhan, “1945-1960 ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler”, in Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş 
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, ed. Baskın Oran, vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 2001), 538-540. Under the Marshall Plan, $17 billion financial aid to European countries 
was   approved in the US Congress. 
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Necmettin Sadak and asked him to help Greece in its present difficult situation by 
making some friendly gesture.13 As a result of positive response from Sadak, a 
joint Statement of Friendship and Adhesion to the United Nation’s principle of 
safeguarding the integrity of national territories was made. It was formalization of 
Turkey’s friendship and political support to the Greek government in the war 
against communist guerilla fighters however this did not bring Turkey either 
economic or military responsibilities.  
While Greece was searching ways for a possible regional alliance with 
Turkey, United Kingdom, France and the Arab countries with the support of 
USA,14 a defense alliance was formed by the trans-Atlantic countries. North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in April 1949 with the 
signatures of USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Britain, France, Portugal, Iceland, and Italy. It was a defense alliance 
created to bring a collective military defense in case of an armed attack on one or 
more of the parties.15 Even though it was not stated officially, within the political 
polarization after the Second World War, with the words of British Lord Ismay 
who was the Secretary-General of NATO during the 1950s, NATO was established 
“to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and USA engaged”.16  
                                                 
13 Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952; The First 
Enlargement of NATO (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 96. 
14 For Greece’s struggles for regional alliances see for detailed information, Ekavi 
Athanassopoulou. 
15 North Atlantic Treaty Organization articles 5-6. For the full text of Treaty see, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm, (accessed October 27, 2007). 
16 http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO, (27.10.2007). 
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After the establishment of NATO, the main defense policy goal of both 
Greece and Turkey was to be a member of the organization.17 They were not 
responded to positively by the NATO members since the inclusion of Greece and 
Turkey would bring more responsibilities while making them less secure against 
the communist threat. However, neither the USA nor Britain had any question 
marks about the strategic importance of those two countries against the Soviet 
expansion and their worries about being isolated by the exclusion from NATO. 
When the Atlantic Pact was signed, American President Truman and British 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin (1945-1951) made a statement declaring the 
continuing interests of the United States and Britain in the security of countries 
which were not covered by the Pact.18 But neither for Turkey nor for Greece, it 
meant a guarantee for collective defense in case of Soviet attack and efforts to be 
included in the Pact continued.19
The negative point of view within NATO about membership of Greece and 
Turkey changed with the outbreak of Korean War. The United States became 
convinced that the danger of Soviet expansion was strictly a military one, and that 
                                                 
17 Melek Fırat, “1945-1960 Yunanistan’la İlişkiler,” in Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından 
Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 
587. 
18 Athanassopoulou, 124. 
19 Turkish Ambassador to Washington Feridun Cemal Erkin gives detailed information in his 
memories about the period and his lobbying activities not only for Turkey but also for Greece to be 
included in the NATO. At the time when the Pact was signed and Turkey was left out of it with 
Greece, Ambassador Erkin brought forward establishment of a Mediterranean Pact which would 
include Turkey, Greece, the UK, France and the USA. With this way, the objections of the small 
states of the Pact which was shown as the main obstacle for their inclusion would be overcome and 
an effective collective defence would be created in the Mediterrenean against Soviet expansion. 
Negative reactions to this suggestion showed that the reasons of their exclusion from the NATO 
was not only objections from the small states. The changing attitude in the USA with the Korean 
War, the insistence of Turkey for membership, and the intense lobbying activities of Erkin in the 
USA and in the European countries brought NATO membership for Turkey and Greece. For 
detailed information about how the process proceeded, see Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dışişlerinde 34 
Yıl Vaşington Büyükelçiliği II 1. Kısım (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992). 
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it could not be resisted only by political and economic reforms but by reliance on 
military elements, not merely in strictly military matters, but in politics as well.20 
The war not only changed American point of view about Turkey’s and Greece’s 
place in a military alliance, but also made them feel more insecure than before with 
the likelihood of aggression by the Soviet Union or by a Soviet satellite directed 
against them. Following the UN resolution, Greece and Turkey sent troops to the 
Korean War with the hope of being rewarded with NATO membership. However, 
it was not only because of its military contribution, but the Korean War itself that 
brought NATO membership to Greece. Even though there were NATO members 
that did not share the American point of view, Greece and Turkey became NATO 
members in 1952 which also formed the first enlargement of the alliance. 
It would not be enough to stress only the military side of NATO 
membership to understand what this meant for Greece. First of all, with NATO 
membership Greece secured the permanent promise of collective defense in case of 
a Soviet attack. This is what Greece had been trying to obtain since the end of the 
Second World War. In addition to that, intense military assistance and economic 
aid from NATO and USA also had a “psychological effect on the country by 
creating a feeling of security among the Greek people”21; a situation essential for 
Greece’s economic recovery and future relations with the EEC. Hatzivassiliou 
points out the effects of intense economic and military aid, in particular American 
aid, on Greece-EEC relations with the words “footing a large part of Greek defense 
                                                 
20 Thanos Veremis, “Greek Security: Issues and Politics,” in Greece and Turkey: Adversity in 
Alliance Adelphi Library 12, ed. Jonathan Alfrod (Great Britain: Biddles Ltd., 1984), 16. 
21 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-62,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 30, no. 1 (Jan. 1995): 194. 
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bill, Washington paid Greece’s entry ticket to the EEC (European Economic 
Community).”22  
NATO not only had positive effect on the formation of Greek-EEC 
relations and economic recovery, it also opened ways for regional alliances with 
Turkey and Yugoslavia. Without securing themselves under the umbrella of a 
collective defense organization, neither Greece nor Turkey would draw close to a 
defense alliance with Yugoslavia which could cause Soviet aggression. In February 
1953 Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Friendship and 
Collaboration and in August 1954, it was followed by the Treaty of Alliance, 
Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance; known as the Balkan Pact.23 With 
the Balkan Pact, Greece secured its borders with Yugoslavia. It would not be 
wrong to point out that these two treaties were the result of international situation 
and friendly Turkish-Greek relations of the time under the common communist 
threat and similar political and economic developments and goals as realizing 
economic and military integration with the capitalist countries of Europe. In 
addition to the developments regarding Greece and Turkey, containment policy of 
the USA and the changes on Yugoslav side were among the main reasons of 
creation of the Pact.24 However, when the Pact was signed the necessary 
                                                 
22 Hatzivassiliou, 194.  
23 With the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration, the three countries aimed to strengthen defense 
and security measures, cooperate in preserving peace, developing economic, technical and cultural 
relations among themselves. The 1954 Balkan Pact, on the other hand, was a defense treaty against 
Soviet threat. 
24 After Yugoslavia’s break with the Cominform in 1948 as a result of Tito–Stalin split, Yugoslavia 
faced with economic blockade and the treat of invasion with the Soviet and satellite propaganda. 
While this situation led Tito to change direction towards the West, it also brought much American 
interest in the region within the containment policy. After the establishment of NATO and 
especially integration of Greece and Turkey within Organization, the need for association of 
Yugoslavia in the Western defense structure increased since it stayed like a hole in the region. This 
situation was overcome with the signing of Treaty of Friendship and Balkan Pact which linked 
Yugoslavia indirectly to NATO. For detailed information about the role of the USA on the 
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conditions for the survival of it had already started to change. After Stalin’s death 
in 1953, he was succeeded by Khrushchev who adopted a policy of restoration of 
broken relations with Yugoslavia. The Tito-Khrushchev compromise eliminated 
the reason of the Pact for Yugoslavia.25 Not only for Yugoslavia, but also for 
Greece and Turkey the priorities changed. The emergence of Cyprus issue at the 
time when Greece and Turkey secured themselves against Communist threat under 
the NATO umbrella provided them a free hand to focus on their bilateral relations. 
Violence in Cyprus, political and social attitude towards the issue cut off the 
‘compulsory’ friendship of Greece and Turkey, which had formed the backbone of 
the Balkan Pact.  
 
2.1.2 Association Agreement with the EEC 
After NATO membership, the first step of one of the most important foreign policy 
achievements of Greece was taken with the application for Association Agreement 
(AA) with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, which was signed 
in 1961. This application had economic, political, psychological, and security 
reasons stemming from Cold War conditions even though the EEC did not possess 
any military elements or goals. Although it was a NATO member, Greece still had 
the “fear of exclusion and isolation that may push her under the influence of 
Eastern bloc because of its trade volume with them.”26 While it was taking part in 
the opposite ideological camp, Greek foreign trade volume with the Eastern bloc 
                                                                                                                                       
formation of Balkan Pact see Levent İşyar, “Containing Tito: US and Soviet Policies towards 
Yugoslavia and the Balkans” (Master’s Thesis, Bilkent University Department of History, 2005).  
25 For detailed information about Tito-Khrushchev compromise see İşyar, 120-124. 
26 Verney, 255.  
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countries had risen from $3 million in 1952 to $37.2 million in 1958.27 In terms of 
Greek exports, by 1961 %25 of it was to the Eastern bloc; a situation that made 
some suspicious about the possibility that “growing economic dependence would 
open the way for eventual political domination.”28 It was strongly believed that the 
AA with the EEC would save Greece from falling under communist rule by 
developing economic relations with West European countries. In addition to 
developed economic relations, with the AA Greece would be able to get economic 
support to recover its economy which would result in rapid economic growth and 
rise in the general standards of living, modernization of Greek industry and 
increased level of production. While the main reasons of application for the AA 
were rooted in security and economics, it was also strongly believed that closer 
relations with West European countries, in the words of Ioannis Pesmazoglou who 
was the leader of Greek delegation which negotiated the association agreement, 
“would stabilize and strengthen the forces of Democracy and Liberty in Greece in 
this critical region of Europe”.29 Besides those reasons, there were no suspicions 
about the European identity of Greece since it was seen as the birthplace of 
European civilization. This common acceptance was also another encouraging 
situation for Greece to become a part of European integration.  
 
2.2 Relations with Turkey and the Outbreak of Cyprus Issue  
Among the reasons of Greece’s application for association agreement with EEC, 
Turkey did not take place as a factor. Turkey and Greece at that time enjoyed a 
                                                 
27 Hatzivassiliou, 192.  
28 Verney, 255. 
29 Hatzivassiliou, 197.   
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period of solidarity. Both countries ignored disagreements in bilateral relations 
after the end of the Second World War until the Cyprus issue re-appeared in 1960s 
and eventually paving the way for 1974 intervention. Hatzivassiliou defines 
Turkish-Greek relations in the first decade of the Cold War as “strategic 
interdependence”.30 In the event of a war, Greece’s position would be very 
difficult if Turkey did not fight – the situation that Greece argues it had lived in the 
Second World War – and if Greece were not a NATO country, Turkey’s position 
would be desperate, since there would be no geographical contact between the 
Turkish and the other NATO forces.31 The ‘compulsory’ solidarity between 
Greece and Turkey was so strong and had the support of Western Bloc, in 
particular of the USA, that the outbreak of the Cyprus question in 1950s was not 
allowed to rule the whole relations and was resolved on an international platform. 
However, it was not a lasting solution for the island and the issue re-broke out in 
the first five-year of the Republic shaking the core of the Turkish-Greek relations 
and the Greek foreign policy formation.  
In solving of the first Cyprus dispute, the personal role of Prime Minister 
Constantine Karamanlis - and Adnan Menderes- should not be ignored. 
Karamanlis, who was the Greek Prime Minister from 1955 to 1963, had the 
objective of solving the Cyprus problem, modernizing the national economy and 
reforming public life, which were all together would serve the main goal of 
integrating Greece more closely with Western Europe.32 He focused on the 
recovery of Greek economy and securing it against communist neighbors. A 
                                                 
30 Hatzivassiliou, 191. 
31 Hatzivassiliou, 191. 
32 C. M. Woodhouse, Karamanlis The Restorer of Greek Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982), 55. 
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problem with Turkey was one of the last things that Karamanlis wished to face. 
However, the confrontation could not be prevented as a result of developments on 
the island and in Turkey, and of the attitude taken by the Greek opposition parties. 
During the 1950s, the Greek solution for the Cyprus problem was enosis, 
which meant unification of Cyprus with Greece. The idea of enosis had its roots in 
the 19th century since Britain had started to govern the island. However, this 
sentiment became stronger during the Second World War and in its aftermath. 
With the cession of the Dodecanese islands by Italy after the Second World War, 
the same situation was expected for Cyprus and it came out louder in March 1947 
in the Greek parliament with the unanimously passed resolution for cession of the 
island to Greece. In the first years of the 1950s the Greek policy was to realize 
enosis by bilateral negotiations with Britain since Turkey was not seen as a part of 
the issue. Britain on the other hand, in the first years of the 1950s did not favor an 
independent Cyprus or its unification with Greece because of its strategic position 
in the Mediterranean for British interests in the Middle East. During this period, 
Turkey preferred to follow a policy of denial of existence of the Cyprus issue and 
supported the status quo on the island, in other words, supported British policy.33 
This policy becomes meaningful when the Cold War conditions of the time are 
considered.  Turkey did not want its relations with the West to be crippled because 
of a crisis with Greece about Cyprus. However, while it was the official side of the 
policy, Turkey also started to provide military assistance and equipment for 
Cypriot Turks by 1955.34
                                                 
33 Fırat, 598. 
34 I am grateful to Prof. Criss for her valuable insight on the informal side of this policy.  
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Besides the accelerating violence on the island, developments in the Middle 
East concerning the Suez Crisis changed the balances in the region.35 After its 
failure in the Suez Crisis, the British lost power and prestige in the Middle East. 
This situation also decreased the need for keeping Cyprus. By then, holding on to 
certain military bases on the island was enough for British interests. As a result 
British power and influence in the Middle East and Cyprus were replaced by the 
Americans with the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957.36 The violence and uneasy 
situation on the island and the dispute between Greece and Turkey attracted 
American interest because of the fact that this could undermine NATO’s south 
wing and bring a convenient situation for the Soviet Union to increase its power in 
the region. An urgent solution to the dispute was needed and the American solution 
was independence of the island. This policy was put into reality by the end of the 
1950s with Zurich and London Agreements to which Turkey, Greece, Britain, 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots adhered. According to Zurich and London 
Agreements, an independent Republic of Cyprus was to be founded with British 
                                                 
35 For detailed information about Suez Crisis see, Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 
“1945-1960 Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler”, in Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, 
Belgeler, Yorumlar 1, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 627.  
36 In his message to Congress on January 5, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower opened the way 
for the Middle East countries to be included in the US security zone. Under the Doctrine, a Middle 
Eastern country could request American economic and military assistance to defend the territorial 
integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed 
aggression. For the full text of the Doctrine see, “The Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East, A 
Message to Congress, January 5, 1957,” 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html (accessed May 5, 2008). This 
doctrine was motivated in part by an increase in Arab hostility toward the West, and growing Soviet 
influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez Crisis of 1956. As a result of the Suez conflict, a 
power vacuum had formed in the Middle East due to the loss of prestige of Great Britain and 
France. Eisenhower feared that this had allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form 
dangerous alliances with Jordan and Syria, and had opened the Middle East to Soviet influence. 
Eisenhower wanted this vacuum filled by the United States before the Soviets could step in to fill 
the void. Because Eisenhower feared that radical nationalism would combine with international 
communism in the region and threaten Western interests, he was willing to commit to sending U.S. 
troops to the Middle East under certain circumstances. see, “Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957,” 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm (accessed May 5, 2008). 
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sovereign military bases; the integrity and the constitution of the state were to be 
guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey; Greece and Turkey would contribute 
contingency forces 950 and 650 respectively. 37
 The first Cyprus dispute was solved by the endeavors of Turkey, Greece, 
Britain and USA on an international platform. The interests of the two neighboring 
countries were once more shaped within the conditions of Cold War and great 
power politics. This situation also served both Greek and Turkish foreign policies 
regarding keeping close relations with Western countries. On the other hand, a 
republic was created for Cyprus which did not respond to the demands of Greek 
Cypriots. Within a few years, the tension and the uneasiness on the island could 
not be prevented. This time the solution could not be as easy as it was in 1959 and 
brought crucial changes for Greek foreign and defense policies to last for decades.  
 
2.3 Athens Agreement: Greek Association Agreement with the European 
Community 
Settlement of the Cyprus dispute was an important step for Greek Association 
Agreement with the EEC. If it had remained unresolved, it would have negatively 
affected Greece’s relations with the EEC. After signing of the founding agreements 
of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek King and Queen accompanied by Evangelos 
Averoff, Greek foreign minister, visited Italy in May 1959 to discuss the 
possibility of Greece’s association with the EEC.38 The process was concluded in a 
short time. On July 15, 1959, Greece applied for Association Agreement, 
                                                 
37 Veremis, 11. 
38 Woodhouse, 89. 
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negotiations started on March 21, 1960, and Treaty of Association was singed on 
July 9, 1961, to become operational in November 1962.   
Two main reasons are seen from EEC’s side to sign Association 
Agreements with third parties. They are “either as an end in itself, to formalize 
relations with countries who had no chance of becoming members of the EC, or as 
a first stage of a process leading to full membership.”39 For the aim of Athens 
Agreement, Article 72 was proof of the latter argument that without putting a 
timetable, the possibility of Greece’s membership to the community was 
preserved. According to article 72: 
As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced for enough 
to justify envisaging full acceptance by Greece of the obligation 
arising out of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of 
the accession of Greece to the Community. 40
 
 While the Agreement kept the possibility of future membership of Greece 
open, it aimed to bring a customs union and harmonization of economic policies 
for the functioning of the association. With those goals, the long term objective of 
the Agreement defined in its first article as: 
to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening of the commercial 
and economic relations between the contracting parties with full 
consideration of the need to ensure the accelerated development of the 
economy of Greece as well as the elevation of the level of employment 
and of the living standards of the Greek people. 41
 
 One of the main questions about Greece-EEC relations is why Greece 
chose to sign an Association Agreement rather than applying directly for 
                                                 
39 Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1997), 47. 
40 Iacovos S. Tsalicoglou, Negotiating for Entry the Accession of Greece to the European 
Community, (USA: Dartmouth Brookfield, 1985), 10.   
41 Werner Feld, “The Association Agreements of the European Communities: A Comparative 
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membership. This situation can be explained especially by economic development 
of Greece. The disparity between Greece’s level of economic development and 
EEC countries of that time made accession impractical for the immediate future.42 
However, as Hatzivassiliou states it, “when they signed the Association Agreement 
in 1961, the Greeks regarded it as nothing less than a stepping stone for eventual 
full membership”.43
 The Greek application for Association Agreement was followed 
immediately by Turkey’s application. Even though they did not perceive direct 
threats from each other during the 1950s, none of them wanted to take the risk of 
being one step behind the other. Of course, Greece’s application was not the only 
reason behind Turkey’s application but among the most important ones. Citing 
similar reasons with Greece, Turkey applied on July 31, 1959, for Association 
Agreement only two weeks after the Greek application. In September 1963 
Turkey’s Association Agreement was signed mostly on the same conditions with 
the Greek one.44  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Verney, 257. 
43 Hatzivassiliou, 196. 
44 The economic provisions of the two agreements were similar however, being different from the 
Athens Agreement the Ankara Agreement envisaged a preparatory stage before the transition 
period during which the custom duties would be gradually abolished. With the preparatory stage, 
Turkey would be able to strengthen its economy with the aid of the Community but without making 
any specific concessions to the Community in return. For details see Feld, 230-234. 
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 CHAPTER 3  
 
 
NEW THREATS, NEW DISPUTES: RE-FORMATION OF 
GREEK DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE 1970S 
 
 
 
In this chapter, the reasons behind re-formation of Greek foreign and defense 
policies in the 1970s will be analyzed. Foreign and defense policies of Greece 
which were formed against the communist threat –as explained in the previous 
chapter–, started to change in the 1960s with the re-emergence of Cyprus issue and 
concluded its evolution with Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus. The aim of this 
chapter is to represent the main disputed issues between Greece and Turkey along 
with the Cyprus issue. Why Cyprus issue re-emerged in a very short time and 
could not be re-settled like the previous one, and which reasons were behind 
emergence of Aegean disputes will be the main questions finding answers. This 
chapter is important to understand the issues, Turkish and Greek arguments in 
Aegean disputes which would be the main focus not only in the bilateral relations 
but also in Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) after Greece’s 
membership to the Club.  
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3.1 Re-emergence of the Cyprus Issue in Turkish-Greek Relations                     
As a result of foreign policy achievements of the 1950s, the 1960s started in a good 
way for Greece. On the one hand, the Cyprus issue was solved in peaceful terms 
with the establishment of Republic of Cyprus with Zurich and London 
Agreements. On the other hand, Greece felt to be a part of Europe more than 
before with NATO membership and with the Association Agreement. However, 
before reaching the midst of the 1960s the climate was reversed with the 
developments in Cyprus. Re-emergence of Cyprus issue in a more bloody way and 
new disputes in the Aegean Sea in the 1970s with Turkey fundamentally changed 
Greece’s threat perceptions and made Athens form new foreign and defense 
policies in the 1970s which would last for more than two decades. 
 Even though treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus were signed by 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, they were only negotiated by the representatives from 
Greece and Turkey under US pressure in Zurich and the agreed points became 
binding in London with the signatures of Fazıl Küçük, the representative of 
Turkish Cypriot community and of Archbishop Makarios, who was the spiritual 
and political leader of the Greek Cypriot community. Even though there was not a 
taksim, the treaties were a kind of success for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. 
Taksim meant partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey and was the 
countering policy of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots against the enosis policy of 
Greece which was coming to surface with strong public supports mostly at times of 
crises.  The vital demands of Turkish community on the island were secured with 
the treaties. The British also did not raise any objections to what had been agreed 
in Zurich since their own interests were safeguarded by the provision of sovereign 
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bases for the British forces.45 On the Greek side the situation was different. 
Karamanlis returned from Zurich to Athens with satisfaction. In Greece he was 
criticized by the opposition with betraying to Hellenism for sake of the interests of 
NATO and the USA.46 From Karamanlis’ point, the island was kept from partition 
and an independent Cyprus on the agreed terms was not a situation of giving up the 
Hellenic ideal. Furthermore, there was “one nation with two voices in all 
international bodies”.47 But convincing Makarios to sign the treaties had not been 
an easy task. Makarios hesitated signing the treaties until the last moment in 
London. In a letter to Prime Minister George Papandreou in 1964, he wrote the 
reason of his hesitation of signing the treaties that there had been no alternative 
possible under the prevailing circumstances and he had not believed for a moment 
that the agreements would constitute a permanent settlement.48 Woodhouse defines 
Makarios’ explanation as both fear and hope: a fear that the settlement would break 
down completely and a hope that it would lead after all to enosis.49  
Archbishop Makarios, the spiritual leader of Greek Cypriot community and 
one of the leading opponents of the Zurich and London Agreements, was elected as 
the President of the Republic. Only two years after the establishment of the Cyprus 
Republic, Makarios’ provocative speeches in favor of enosis started. From the very 
beginning, the Greek Cypriots had claimed that the treaties gave Turkish Cypriots 
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48 Woodhouse, p. 87. 
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more rights than they should have had regarding their population percentage.50 For 
this reason the constitution was evaluated as unfair and unworkable.  
The famous 13 amendments to the constitution, the first step for the 
collapse of the Cyprus Republic, were introduced by Makarios in November 1963. 
With those amendments, the bi-communal spirit of the Zurich and London 
Agreements would be abolished and an integrated, unitary state where the Turkish 
Cypriots would be lowered from equal partners to minority status would be 
created.  
The timing of Makarios for announcing the aim to revise the constitution 
was noteworthy. It was made in November 1963 just after the general elections in 
Greece. Elections brought Centre Union (EK –Enosi Kentriou) of George 
Papandreou to power after Karamanlis’ premiership since 1955. Papandreou had 
always been a strong critic of Karamanlis’ policies especially about becoming an 
associate member with the EEC, NATO’s military existence in Greece, the Cyprus 
issue and relations with the USA and Turkey. He supported the view that Greece 
should have followed a more independent foreign policy to protect its national 
interests and serve Hellenism. He argued that until then the national interests of 
Greek people were smashed under US and NATO’s interests. His attitude about 
Cyprus also had vital importance on the growth of the issue in the coming years. 
He was one of the strongest supporters of enosis and that a critic of Zurich and 
London Agreements.  
Just after the constitutional amendments of Makarios, attacks of Greek 
forces on Turkish settlements and inter-communal fighting started on the island. 
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Turkish Cypriots who made up 18% of the population of the island.  
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The war situation continued until Turkish military intervention in 1974. Before that 
date, there had been possibilities of Turkish intervention on the island; once in 
1964 and then in 1967. In both cases, the main power which stopped Turkish 
intervention was the USA. The main reason of USA’ interference was to avoid a 
war between Greece and Turkey and the fact that war between them would not 
only weaken NATO, but it would be also open the way for Soviet expansion in the 
Mediterranean. With the violence and inter-communal clashes starting after 
Makarios’ announcement of the constitutional amendments, demographical change 
also started on the island with Turkish Cypriots moving to the north and Greek 
Cypriots to the south. This change would bear important results in the post-1974 
period.  
Before any action was taken, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu informed the 
USA of the situation with the hope that the US would not let a war within NATO 
and press on Greece and Greek Cypriots to solve the issue.51 However, instead of 
putting pressure on Greece and Greek Cypriots, USA preferred to warn Turkey to 
face the possible outcomes of such an action. In the infamous letter to Inonu, 
President Johnson stated that “NATO allies have not had a chance to consider 
whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if 
Turkey takes step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and 
understanding of its NATO allies”.52 A short time after the Johnson’s Letter, a 
peace project was proposed in 1964 by Dean Acheson, who was assigned by the 
                                                 
51 Melef Fırat, “1960-1980 Yunanistan’la İlişkiler”, in Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından 
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52 Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (Boulder: Westview press, 1990), 63.  At 
that time, Soviet leader Khrushchev was threatening Turkey with nuclear war if it interwined in 
Cyprus. I am grateful to Prof. Nur Bilge Criss for her comments on the issue.  
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US president to find a settlement to the disputes. Acheson Plan can be seen as an 
enosis plan with a piece of taksim inside. Both the Turkish and Greek governments 
thought the plan worthy of discussion.53 However, because of Makarios’ objection 
to negotiate it, Papandreou felt obliged to retreat and follow him.54 This situation 
showed that different from the 1950s, a solution without the full consent of the 
Cyprus’ communities would not be possible. Since the 1960s, Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots had more to say for their future and started to rule their destinies by their 
actions more than before. 
The second highest possibility of Turkish intervention came in 1967 after 
the attacks on two Turkish villages Boğaziçi and Geçitkale. Mobilization of forces 
for a possible intervention brought intense diplomatic activity by the international 
powers, especially by the USA. An agreement was reached as a result of Greece’s 
compliance with Turkey’s demands. The change in Greece’s attitude is worth 
analyzing. After Papandreou’s complete victory in the elections of February 1964, 
the situation did not continue long to his advantage. Starting in summer of 1965, 
Greece entered a period of unstable governments.55 On April 21, 1967 this ended 
when the Colonels took over. Until 1974, Greece stayed under military 
dictatorship. A few months after they had seized power, the Cyprus issue broke 
out. Different from Papandreou, the junta had to follow moderate policies because 
of the need to have some support for their unfavored regime. In addition to that, the 
Cyprus issue appeared on their agenda only six months after they had seized power 
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and the regime was not strong enough to follow independent policies. In order to 
get the support of Europeans and Americans, the Colonels chose to compromise by 
accepting the withdrawal of 12.000 Greek troops from the island, which were sent 
secretly to the island after the clashes had started.  This situation is evaluated by 
Tozun Bahcheli from a more pragmatic approach for the future of the island. He 
states that with “the withdrawal of those troops, Greece lost a very important 
deterrent against Turkey’s future military intervention on the island”.56 Today, 
even though it cannot be known whether Turkey’s reaction would have been 
different if those troops had stayed on the island, the reasons for Turkey’s military 
intervention did not change.  
On July 15, 1974 the military regime of Greece attempted a coup against 
Makarios who had been following more independent policies, getting the 
sympathy and support of Soviet Union and diverging from the enosis policy. He 
was overthrown and replaced by a pro-enosis government. This event was the last 
drop bringing Turkish intervention on the island. Before the unilateral intervention, 
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit had called in Britain for an intervention under the 
Treaty of Guarantee but it was refused. On July 20, depending on its right from 
Treaty of Guarantor to maintain the survival of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish 
forces landed on the island. The reason and the aim explained by Ecevit was that 
Greece’s action on the island aimed to destroy the independent Cyprus Republic, 
and it was against the agreements signed. Being responsible for the territorial 
integrity and constitutional order of Cyprus Republic, Turkey exercised the 
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authority and duty given by the treaties.57 According to Article IV of the Treaty of 
Guarantee “each of the guarantor powers reserved the right to the take unilateral 
action, if necessary, but only with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs 
created by the… Treaty”.58 In addition to this right, Turkey also kept “the right of 
individual self defense under U.N. Charter Article 51” since the coup in the island 
posed a danger to Turkey by “bringing Greek military power to judicially 
independent island forty miles away”.59  
Within those circumstances the first Turkish intervention was accepted by 
many Western observers in line with the international law and treaties. However, 
the situation was reversed with the second intervention on the island which 
happened when the sides could not reach an agreement in Geneva talks. Totally 
different from the reactions towards the first intervention, the second intervention 
was evaluated in the international society as ‘occupation’. 
It would not be wrong to state that the second Turkish intervention on 
Cyprus was a turning point for Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Since then, there has 
been a divided island in the Mediterranean where the Greek Cypriots have been 
acting as the legal authority; Turkish Cypriots have been marginalized from the 
rest of the world and dealing with economic and political problems. One of the 
outcomes of the intervention which was be evaluated to be positive, was the fact 
that it brought the end of military dictatorship in Greece. Without any domestic 
and international support, the junta was left nothing but to call back Karamanlis to 
power. In July, democratic regime in Greece was established. In addition to this 
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positive outcome of the intervention, it is worth to emphasize that no Cypriot 
Turks have been killed since then.  
While 1974 was the year of return to democratic regime for Greece, it also 
pointed out the start of a new era for Greek foreign and defense policies. Until the 
midst of the 1990s, Turkey was the main determinant of Greek foreign and defense 
policy, under the discourse of ‘the threat from East’. Strengthened with the 
existence of Aegean disputes, this perception was not only effective in the bilateral 
relations of the two countries, but was also fundamentally effective on their 
relations with third parties especially with the European Community (EC). 
 
3.2 Aegean Disputes 
Besides the Cyprus issue, new disputes started to appear in Turkish-Greek relations 
since the 1970s. Partly because of the negative atmosphere caused by Cyprus, 
partly because of newly existing concepts in international law, problems related to 
sovereignty rights in the Aegean were brought to Greek and Turkish agendas. The 
de facto situations resulted by unilateral Greek declarations had not been denied by 
Turkey either during the times of cooperation and friendship of the 1930s or during 
the years of ‘compulsory’ friendship of the Cold War. With the Cyprus issue and 
existence of the continental shelf problem, the other Aegean problems were also 
brought to surface within the atmosphere of threat and lack of confidence. As it is 
stated by Aydin, “although Cyprus and Aegean disputes are quite separate issues, 
there is an obvious psychological linkage between them”.60 Also in the academic 
and diplomatic environments of the 1970s, it was accepted that Cyprus issue, 
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Aegean airspace and continental shelf disputes had been affecting each other at 
different levels and would continue to do so.61 Now it will be helpful to go through 
the main Aegean disputes and arguments of Greece and Turkey for a better 
understanding of policies followed by Greece towards Turkey within the EU. 
The sovereignty rights of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea had been 
designated in the Lausanne Treaty which was signed on 24 July 1923. After 
Lausanne, some amendments were made about the regime of the Straits in the 
Montreux Convention of 1936. Those amendments ended the international 
governance of the Straits and increased Turkish sovereignty over them. However, 
it opened a way for a dispute between Greece and Turkey about militarization of 
the Greek islands of Lemnos and Samothrace. These were not the only islands and 
their demilitarization status was not the only issue of disagreement between Greece 
and Turkey. Militarization of the Dodecanese Islands, unilateral declarations of 
Greece about territorial waters and airspace, existence of the ‘continental shelf’ 
concept in the International Law of the Sea, and FIR control were the other 
disputes that have been keeping Greece and Turkey busy for decades.  
 Indeed, there has also been disagreement between Greece and Turkey about 
which the problematic issues were in the Aegean. Lack of a common 
understanding about Aegean problems has also brought complications to the issue. 
According to Greece, there is one issue of dispute, which is the continental shelf 
issue, and the rest of the issues are violations of its sovereign rights in the Aegean. 
On the other hand, for Turkey continental shelf is one of the disputed issues in the 
Aegean besides territorial waters, airspace, FIR line, demilitarization of the Eastern 
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Aegean islands. Turkey advocates political negotiations for the settlement of the 
disputes and since 1996, after the necessary steps are taken in bilateral 
negotiations, taking the issue as a package before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has been supported.  
 
3.2.1 Continental Shelf 
Continental Shelf is quite a new concept in international law and relations. As a 
law concept it came on the scene in September 1945 in a declaration of the 
American President Truman.62 In this declaration, Truman pointed out American 
interests and right of usage of the natural resources under the sea bed which 
formed the continental shelf attached to American coasts and were under open 
seas. This declaration opened the way for new arguments in international law of 
the sea and bilateral relations of coastal countries because of clashing zones of 
continental shelves. After President Truman’s declaration, the main step about the 
continental shelf rights of states came in the 1958 Geneva Convention. 
Accordingly, the outer limits of a continental shelf of a country can be decided in 
two different ways: 200 meters depth or beyond to a depth where exploitation is 
technically feasible.63 This open explanation had the strong potential to create 
problems among coastal states depending on the development of technology. In 
addition to the outer limit explanation of the Convention, it also stated that islands 
can also have continental shelf.  This Convention forms the basis of Greek 
arguments. 
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After the Geneva Convention, the other contribution to the issue of 
continental shelf was brought by the ICJ in 1969. A declaration was made about 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases between Netherlands, Denmark and 
Germany. For the issue, the court expressed that the basic principle in continental 
shelf is the natural prolongation of the coastal state under the sea.64 This 
declaration forms the basis of Turkish argument about the continental shelf issue in 
the Aegean.   
 In the case of Aegean, the continental shelf issue is “very much related to 
existence of oil in the Aegean” however, “the Greek discoveries turned out to have 
been much smaller than originally estimated, and the Turkish explorations located 
no oil”.65 Both sides have different views about the existence of the dispute. 
According to Turkey, the dispute appeared in 1970 when the Greek junta started 
explorations around Thasos.66 On the other hand, Greece argues that the dispute 
started in 1973 when Turkey awarded mineral exploration rights in the Eastern 
Aegean to the Turkish State Petroleum Company, TPAO.67 This permission was 
supported by the map published in the Turkish Official Gazette “giving the limiting 
line of the Turkish continental shelf as being west of the Greek islands of 
Samothrace, Lemnos, Agios Efstratios, Lesbos, Chios, Psara and Antipsara.68 
Turkish surveys started in 1974 with Çandarlı ship and continued in 1976 with 
Sismik-1. Those surveys brought Greek response since there was an overlapping 
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situation with the continental shelf that Greece accepted as its right to explore and 
exploit.  
To understand the importance of continental shelf issue, the political and 
military sides of the issue should also be taken into account. Those were the years 
when there was high tension between Greece and Turkey because of Turkish 
intervention on Cyprus, illegal militarization of the Aegean islands and foundation 
of the Fourth Army, the so-called the Aegean Army. Within the atmosphere of lack 
of confidence and threat, every step taken by one of the sides was evaluated as an 
offensive action by the other. For this reason besides economic reasons, the 
continental shelf issue was closely related to the political and military issues in 
bilateral relations.  
 According to Greece, what Turkey is doing is not in line with international 
law. Having the advantageous situation of thousands of islands and islets69 in the 
Aegean, Greece defends that like the mainland, islands also have continental 
shelves. Greek islands form a unity with the mainland and a median line between 
Greek islands and Turkey should be applied.70 In this way, the unity of Greek 
lands would not be disturbed. On the other hand, Turkey finds the Greek argument 
offensive in the way to make Aegean a Greek lake. Taking the declaration of ICJ 
as the basis, Ankara defends ‘natural prolongation’ and ‘equity’ for the solution of 
the continental shelf issue. According to the Turkish point of view, open sea rules 
cannot be applicable in the Aegean because of its special characteristics and semi-
closed character. In accordance with the principles of equality and equity, natural 
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prolongation principle should be applied in the Aegean for a settlement. About the 
Greek islands, Turkey argues that “they are the elevations on the Turkish 
continental shelf” and do not create any this kind of rights for Greece.71 Since the 
natural prolongation of Anatolia reached the west coasts of Greek islands, it is 
Turkey’s right to have the exploration and exploitation of the area and it does not 
form any threat to Greek existence or territorial integrity of its islands. However, 
within the high tension of the 1970s, Greece had the fear of enclosure of Eastern 
islands by Turkey and losing communication with its islands, even losing the 
islands.72  
The two states have different views for the solution of the dispute. Greece 
has been advocating the view that the issue should be taken before ICJ and a 
judicial solution is needed. Turkey, on the other hand, defends that like the other 
Aegean disputes, continental shelf issue is also a political issue and should be 
settled in bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey. However, since 1996 
Turkey does not reject to go before the Court if bilateral negotiations fail and the 
disputes are treated as a package. 
 
3.2.2 Territorial Waters 
Territorial waters of a state are the waters that surround its lands and are regarded 
the same with territories in terms of sovereign rights over them. Territorial waters 
of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea were determined in the Lausanne Treaty 
as 3 nautical miles (n.m.). This situation was changed unilaterally by Greece in 
1936 as 6 n.m. For almost 30 years, Turkey did not respond to Greek action within 
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the friendly atmosphere between the two countries and the potential Italian threat 
in the Mediterranean. Turkey followed Greece in 1964 by extending its territorial 
waters to 6 n.m. at a time when the Cyprus issue was at the top of their agendas. 
With 6 n.m. territorial waters, Greece, due to its nearly 3000 islands and islets, 
possessed %35 while Turkey held %8, 8 of the Aegean.73
Territorial waters started to become a disputed issue between Greece and 
Turkey in the 1970s. With the Cyprus Peace Operation, both of the countries 
started to handle the territorial waters issue within national security concerns.74 
The very core of territorial waters issue derives from the possibility of Greece’s 
extension of its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 n.m. Depending on the 
general international tendency of extension of territorial waters up to 12 n.m., 
Greece argued to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 n.m. “Were she to 
do so, and Turkey to follow suit, the Greek share of the Aegean would rise to 63.9 
% and the Turkish only to 10 %, the proportion of remaining High Sea would fall 
from 56 % to 26.1 %”.75 In this case, “all ships sailing westwards from Turkish 
Aegean ports to the Mediterranean would be obliged to pass through Greek 
waters”.76 Giving the right of free passage to the control of another state, even if it 
is a friendly one, is not an acceptable situation for Turkey. 
Putting forwards the semi-closed characteristic of the Aegean, Turkey 
argues that territorial waters of 12 miles cannot be applicable. Within the negative 
atmosphere of relations, Turkey responded to the Greek demand by declaring a 
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casus belli in 1974. According to this decision of the Turkish government, and 
extension of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean beyond 6 miles, would be 
considered as a reason for war.  
An important event for the territorial waters issue was the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). According to article 3 of the 
Convention which was accepted during the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS III), “every state has the right to establish the breadth of its 
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles.”77 While Greece was 
part of the Convention and a strong supporter of 12 miles territorial waters since it 
was bringing very advantageous situation arising of her thousands of islands and 
islets around the mainland, Turkey has not signed the Convention and rejects 
Greece’s demand in the Aegean. Still today, Greece argues that it has the right to 
enlarge its territorial waters up to 12 n.m. and Turkey violates international laws by 
preventing Athens from using rights deriving from international law. For the 
territorial waters dispute of Greece and Turkey, Monteagle Stearns states that 
“Greece reserves a right that she does not intend to use, Turkey reserves a threat 
that she does not intend to realize”.78  
 
3.2.3 Airspace and FIR Line 
According to the Chicago Convention of 1944 on Civil Aviation, the airspace of a 
state is the airspace above its territory and its territorial waters. Just like the 
territory and territorial waters, states have full sovereignty within their airspaces. 
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The outer limit of airspace is also the outer limits of territorial waters.79 However, 
it seems that the only exception in the world to this rule is the Greek airspace.80  
 In the Lausanne Treaty, the airspaces of Greece and Turkey were 
determined as 3 miles, the same with their territorial waters. In 1931, Greece 
extended its airspace to 10 miles. This situation was not rejected by Turkey during 
those years when civil and the military air traffics were very limited.81 Even 
though Greece is unique with its airspace situation, it tries to get over this situation 
by the application of “double arrangement”.82 After the declaration of 6 n.m. of 
territorial waters, Greece stated that there are two different lateral limits of 
territorial waters: “a 6-mile territorial sea, for general purposes, established by Law 
in 1936, with a 10-mile territorial sea, established by Decree in 1931 for aviation 
and air policing purposes”.83 In addition to that, for the security for the islands, it is 
advocated that 10 miles was necessary.  
For 44 years, Turkey did not make any objections to Greece’s 10-mile 
airspace. The issue was brought on the agenda in 1975 with the other Aegean 
disputes and Cyprus issue. In order to avoid the situation from becoming a 
customary rule in international law, “Turkish military crafts systematically and 
periodically have been entering the 4 mile zone which is not accepted as Greek 
airspace”.84
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 The other issue concerning airspace over the Aegean is the FIR (Flight 
Information Region) line. FIR is an airspace established to provide necessary 
information to civilian aircraft for safer flights. While it brings states the 
responsibilities of provision of information, it does not bring any sovereignty rights 
on the stated region. The Athens Flight Information Region was agreed at the 
Regional Air-Traffic Conferences of 1950, 1952, and 1958 in which Turkey 
participated and had fully accepted the boundaries of Greece's FIR.85 According to 
this decision except for the Turkish airspace on its territory and territorial waters, 
the air traffic over the Aegean would be controlled by Greece. The reason for 
Turkey’s leaving of the control of the FIR to Greece laid in the economic brunt by 
the technical equipment necessary for the FIR control.86 Like the other Aegean 
disputes, FIR issue appeared to be a problem between the two countries after the 
military intervention to Cyprus in 1974. In order to protect its security against in 
case of an attack from the Aegean, Turkey issued NOTAM 714 (Notice to 
Aircraft) on August 4, 1974. With this notice, Turkey unilaterally extended its area 
of responsibility up to the middle of the Aegean through Athens FIR, asking for 
information in advance before the aircraft pass to the East of the new line.87  The 
situation was worsened with Greek declaration of NOTAM 1157 in September 
which stated the air corridor between Greece and Turkey as a danger zone. Both of 
the states, first Turkey then Greece, pulled back their declarations in 1980 mainly 
as a result of the impractical results and international pressure on them. However, 
it did not end the FIR issue between Greece and Turkey. The dispute within the 
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FIR line has continued for the status of the military aircraft. According to Greece, 
“in accordance with ICAO rules and international practice, all civil and military 
aircraft should submit their flight plans prior to their entry into the Athens FIR for 
reasons of safety for civilian flights.”88 However, Turkey argues that depending on 
article 3 of the Chicago Convention, this should not be applied to state aircraft 
which includes the aircraft used in military, customs and police services.89 Since 
then, Turkey refuses to submit flight plans for entry of its military aircraft into 
Athens FIR. Turkey, on the other hand “demands a modification of the Aegean 
FIR responsibilities on the grounds of equity and national security”.90 Greece wills 
to preserve the status-quo because of the fear that any kind of responsibility given 
to Turkey in the west of the Greek islands might later lead to further demands 
regarding their sovereignty.91  
 
3.2.4 Demilitarization of the East Aegean Islands 
The militarized situation of the East Aegean islands which are a few miles beyond 
Turkish coasts, forms one of the most important issues of the Aegean for Turkey 
while Greece defines the situation as legal depending on changes in the 
international environment. 
 In the Lausanne Treaty, the demilitarized status of six Greek islands closest 
to Turkish coasts, stated as the Eastern Mediterranean islands in the said treaty, 
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were defined. For the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria, the article 
13 states that: 
No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said 
islands; Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the 
territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government 
will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands; the Greek 
military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal 
contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the 
spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to 
the force of the gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the 
Greek territory. 92
 
 While the demilitarized situation of those four islands were put out clearly 
in the Lausanne Treaty, the situation for Lemnos and Samothrace were cleared in 
the Convention Related to the Regime of the Straits which was signed on the same 
day with Lausanne Treaty and took place in article 23 with the declaration that 
they had the same force and effect on the contracting parties. In the Straits 
Convention of 1923, the demilitarization of Samothrace and Lemnos was declared 
in article 4 with the Turkish islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands for free 
passage and navigation from the Straits.93 The last group of islands, the 
Dodecanese Islands, was ceded to Greece by Italy after the Second World War in 
1947 with the Treaty of Paris. According to article 14 of this treaty, except for 
internal security forces, those islands would be free of military forces.94  
The issue of militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands mostly started to 
take place in the 1970s within the atmosphere of security perceptions and 
considerations. After the Cyprus military intervention, Greek foreign and defense 
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policies were to be shaped against the Turkish threat. Within the existing 
international conditions Greece tried to justify the militarization of those islands. 
Greece has been putting a legal base for the militarization of the Eastern Aegean 
Islands in three ways. First of all, Greece argues that the 1936 Montreux 
Convention on the Regime of the Straits gave the right of militarization of Lemnos 
and Samothrace. For Lesvos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria, it is argued that the 
Lausanne Treaty does not foresee total demilitarization of the islands and “Greece 
does indeed maintain a military presence on these islands in light of the need to 
protect her eastern frontier.”95 For the militarized status of the Dodecanese, Greece 
argues that Turkey does not have a say since it is not a part of the 1947 Paris 
Treaty. Among the main reason of militarization of the islands Greece states was 
the foundation of Turkish Aegean Army in 1975 which is not given under NATO 
command. This army was founded for a possible attack from the Aegean, and as a 
reaction to America’s arms embargo after the Cyprus intervention, Turkey 
preferred to keep it out of NATO.  Because of the existence of this army, Greece 
expresses that she feels threatened and as a result of its right driving from the UN 
charter, for legitimate defense, those islands have been militarized. 
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 CHAPTER 4  
 
 
RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:  
GREECE IN, TURKEY OUT 1981-1990 
 
 
 
This chapter will analyze the first decade of Greece in the EC as a full member 
with special emphasis on Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey’s relations with the 
Community. Firstly, reasons behind the Greek application for EC membership and 
Turkey’s place among these reasons will be discussed. Greece’s application for 
membership forms a milestone not only in the Greek history but also in the history 
of Turkish-Greek relations – a situation known well by Greece, Turkey and by the 
Community.  Secondly, the main ideas and policies of PASOK under leadership of 
George Papandreou and its counterpart in Turkey, ANAP led by Turgut Özal will 
be analyzed since they ruled their countries almost for the entire decade. This 
analysis will be helpful to have a better understanding of reasons behind Turkish 
application for EC membership and Greek reactions to it. Lastly in this chapter, the 
two other important developments of Turkish-Greek relations in the 1980s, the 
crisis of 1987 and the Davos process will be discussed.  
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4.1 Foreign Policy of Karamanlis and Greece’s EC Membership 
 
4.1.1 Greece’s Application for EC/EU Membership 
The year 1974 was the starting of a new era in Greek politics with new threat 
perceptions. Whatever the ideological and foreign policy understanding they had, 
Greek governments since 1974 had a common view of the existence of a ‘Turkish 
threat’.96 The perception in Athens was that because of its relative strategic 
importance compared with that of Greece, with the support of the US and NATO 
and the toleration of the Soviet Union, Turkey attempted to achieve a unilateral 
revision of the status quo established by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the 1936 
Montreux Treaty and the 1947 Treaty of Paris.97 Actually to see Turkey as a 
threatening neighbor was not rootless. According to Michalis Papakonstantinou, 
the former Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, the ‘threat from the East’ had 
already existed in the subconscious of the Greek people; it was not difficult to find 
a threat to take the place of ‘the threat from the North’ which it had been weakened 
with détente between the blocks.98 Détente had undeniable effect on inter bloc 
relations and brought to surface various disputes within the blocs. In the Western 
bloc, Greek-Turkish disputes were the first to appear with the Cyprus crisis.99 For 
the period 1974-1996, Heraclides states that it was the period of Cold War between 
Greece and Turkey which had the potential for hot conflict.100
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The period “1974-1981 was formulated and conducted largely under 
Karamanlis’ personal control and the assistance of his diplomatic advisor, Petros 
Molyviatis”.101 When Karamanlis came back to power, he first thought of 
declaring war on Turkey however; the unprepared situation of the army kept him 
away from this kind of action.102 As a reaction to Turkish military intervention and 
to the USA who did not prevent Turkish action, Greece withdrew from NATO’s 
military flank. Also, the Greek lobby in the US was effective for the enforcement 
of an arms embargo on Turkey after the military intervention in Cyprus.  
The foundation of Greek foreign policy after the re-establishment of 
democracy was based on Karamanlis’ principle of ‘we belong to the West’.103 This 
principle also shaped the way Karamanlis handled relations with Turkey. The main 
foreign policy goals and the way issues would be handled were expressed in his 
first speech in the parliament after the 1974 elections as Prime Minister. In the 
speech, “he announced for the first time his intention to secure full membership of 
the European Economic Community”.104 “Karamanlis saw membership as marking 
the end of a long period of political isolation which would strengthen Greek 
independence and bargaining power in the relations with the third parties, while 
allowing Greece to actively participate in the political development of Europe”.105 
Signs of a more independent policy than before were given with the aim of closer 
co-operation in the Balkans and with the Arab countries of the Middle East.106 In 
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terms of Cyprus issue, “he promised moral support but emphasized that ‘Greece 
prefers negotiation to confrontation’.107  
Among the foreign policy goals, without doubt, membership to EC first 
came for Karamanlis. As it is stated in the official web site of the Greek Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, four main reasons, which were mainly political existed for the 
application.108 First of all, it was thought that under the institutional framework of 
the community, stability could be brought to the democratic political system and 
institutions. Secondly, it was expected that membership would contribute to the 
development and modernization of the Greek economy and society. In addition to 
those domestic reasons, there were foreign policy aims behind the will of to join 
the Club. EC was seen “as a potential counterbalance to the two superpowers”.109 
There was intense anti-Americanism in Greek society because of “the widespread 
conviction of CIA involvement in the military coup and profound disappointment 
with NATO’s stance of non-intervention in the Cyprus question”.110 In addition to 
that, the USA was accused of not preventing Turkish intervention in Cyprus. 
Within those circumstances, EC membership was evaluated as a way to loosen 
Greece’s ties with the USA. Besides, it would also empower Greece’s regional and 
international position. ‘Turkish threat’ was also among the driving forces of 
Greece’s application for full membership. It was thought that membership to the 
community would raise Greece’s power of negotiation against Turkey in bilateral 
disputes. In addition to political and economic reasons of Greek membership 
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application, Richard Clogg argues the existence of psychological reasons behind 
the Greek will to be in the Community; “as if Greece was not a part of Europe, 
Greeks were talking about entering the Europe.”111  
It was a situation known by Greece, Turkey and the EC that Turkish-Greek 
relations and Greek membership to the community were interrelated. It was 
commonly known that Turkish-Greek disputes influenced the way Greece acted 
towards the EC and would also be affected by the level of the relations between 
Greece and the Community. After the formal application for full membership on 
June 12, 1975, the Commission’s Opinion came on 28 January. In its opinion, 
because of three reasons, a pre-accession stage was proposed before a membership 
status was given. The economic unpreparedness of Greece for membership and the 
impact of Greek membership on the deepening of the EC were the two reasons put 
forward by the Commission.112 The other reason was about the balanced state of 
Turkish-Greek relations. The Community had placed itself at an equal distance 
from Greece and Turkey with the Association Agreements which kept full 
membership as their common objective even though they had different time tables 
for it. Starting the accession negotiations with Greece at a time when it had 
disputes with Turkey would also draw the Community into the disputed issues and 
would make it a side. “To avoid this situation, the Commission suggested that the 
Community should play an active role in helping Greece and Turkey resolve their 
differences in parallel with the preparatory work for Greek accession”.113  
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The Commission’s Opinion was rejected by the Council at the meeting on 
February 9, 1976, unanimously, and Greek application for membership was 
accepted without any qualifications. In its decision three main reasons may be cited 
for the Council’s positive attitude towards Greek application. First of all, the 
assurances given by Greece that once it became a full member it would not block 
the development of Turkey’s relations with the Community.114 Even though this 
assurance did not alleviate Turkey’s fears of Greek membership, it had an effective 
role on the community’s final decision. It was thought that “full accession 
negotiations would help to reintegrate Greece into the Western security alliance at 
a time of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean”.115 The other reason was about the 
future of EC’s role in the Mediterranean. The Community was willing to have a 
more active role in the consolidation of democracy in the Mediterranean region 
and delaying the Greek application might have sent wrong signals to Portugal and 
Spain.116As a result of the positive response of the Council, the agreement for 
Greek membership was signed in May 1979 in Athens, became effective on 
January 10, 1981.117  
 
4.1.2 Turkey’s reaction to Greek Membership Application 
Without any doubt, Greek membership application to the community caused an 
uneasy situation in Turkish politics. From the very beginning, it was thought that 
Greece would attain advantages in political and economic terms once it joined the 
EC. Turkey’s discontent with the situation was, on the surface, confined to the 
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diplomacy corridors of Ankara and in their talks with Brussels. Within those 
conditions there are theses that the 1976 Aegean crisis had the hidden aim behind 
regarding the Greek application. According to Harris C. Georgiades:  
It has been maintained that the purpose of the expedition of the 
Turkish navy survey ship Sismik 1 in the Aegean Sea in July 1976 was 
to provoke a crisis in Greek-Turkish relations and make visible to the 
Community the dangers involved in accepting Greece as a member 
state”. 118
  
It was the positive outcomes with Greek membership and the Greek 
assurance that made the Community ignore Turkish-Greek disputes at that time. 
Depending on the Greek assurance, the Community also tried to put Turkey at ease 
by assuring that “Greece’s accession would not affect the development of EC-
Turkey relations”.119 However, the developments after Greece’s accession did not 
affirm either the Greek assurance to the Community or the Community’s assurance 
to Turkey. Turkey’s relations with the Community, which were only economic at 
the beginning, started to gain political dimensions with Greece’s membership to 
the Community.120  
  It is not possible to state that Turkey’s relations with the Community were 
going absolutely well before the Greek application for membership. The Cyprus 
intervention and Turkey’s intentions for revisions in the agreements signed with 
the EC had increased tension. In 1973, the Additional Protocol came into effect. It 
was an integral part of the Ankara Treaty and laid down the regulations and rules 
of a transition period of 22 years for Turkey’s participation in the customs union. 
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However, its application process was not without problems. Just five days after the 
meeting of the Association Council in December 1976, Turkey decided to 
postpone unilaterally its obligations for one year which were created by the 
Additional Protocol.121 After this delay, Turkey’s relations with the Community 
could not be normalized in the last years of the 1970s. The Turkish Prime Minister 
Bulent Ecevit evaluated the situation as an “increasing isolation of Turkey in the 
European Economic Community of which she is an associate member”.122 In 
addition to that, he had foreseen the situation to appear in the 1990s. In a meeting 
in 1978 with the President, Council of EC, Roy Jenkins, he did not hesitate to point 
out the difficulties the other EC members might face because of possible Greek 
veto on issues related to Turkey’s relations with the Community: 
Of course it is not up to us to say anything as to whether Greece 
should become a full member or not …. it is up to Greece and the nine 
members of the European Community to decide that. But considering 
that there is a possibility of the right of veto being used in the EEC on 
many issues, Greece inclusion as a full member when the veto system 
is still in effect might drag the other existing members of the EEC into 
such positions where they may find themselves, in spite of themselves, 
applying embargoes on Turkey similar to that which has been applied 
by the United States against Turkey for over three years. 123  
 
Disrupted relations of the 1970s between Turkey and the EC were frozen 
by the Community in 1980 as a result of the military coup in Turkey. 
Normalization of relations was postponed to a date nobody knew at the time.  
 
                                                 
121 Çağrı Erhan, Tuğrul Arat, “1960-1980 AT’yle İlişkiler”, in Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş 
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, ed. Baskın Oran, vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 2001), 850. 
122 Bulent Ecevit, “Turkey’s Security Policies”, Jonathan Alford, Greece and Turkey: Adversity in 
Alliance, Adelphi Library 12, Great Britain, Biddles Ltd., 1984, pp.136-141, p. 137. 
123 Ecevit, 137. 
 52
4.2 The First Decade of Greek Membership to the EC and Turkish-Greek 
Relations under Its Shadow 
 
4.2.1 The Core Ideas of PASOK and Its Rule in Greek Politics 
Just like in Turkey, early in the 1980s, there was an important change in Greek 
political power. As a result of the elections in October 1981, PASOK – Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement, Panellino Sosialistiko Kinima –got 172 seats of the total 300 
in the parliament by getting 48% of the votes.124 It was more than a simple 
success. The party was newly founded in 1974 by Andreas Papandreou and it did 
not have definite roots in Greek politics. The 1981 elections was not the first and 
the only success of PASOK. In the first elections in 1974, they showed a good 
performance by getting the 14 % of the votes and in their third elections of their 
history they got almost half of the votes and founded the new government of 
Greece. The PASOK victory was not a temporary one. They directed Greek 
politics as government for the rest of the 1980s, and more than half of the 1990s, 
and for the rest of the time they were the main opposition party in the parliament. 
Today, they continue to be the main opposition party in Greek politics as a result 
of the 2007 elections.125 Pointing out the place of PASOK in Greek politics from 
the time it was established, to have a thorough analysis of political attitude, 
perceptions and goals of PASOK with a special emphasis on Papandreou as the 
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founder will be very helpful to understand Greek policies followed towards Turkey 
in the 1980s and most of the 1990s.  
 Since the time it was established, PASOK was a party of center of ‘anti-’ 
point of view. Actually it was seen more than a political party by its supporters; it 
was a movement in the Greek society for “Megali Allagi”.126 When someone had a 
dispute with PASOK and left the party, it was said that she/he “placed themselves 
outside the movement”.127 Even though the situation of being the center of ‘anti-’ 
has changed by time, especially for the 1970s and half of the1980s PASOK kept its 
anti-European and anti-American characteristics high. It was “extremely successful 
in combining anti-capitalist discourse with the historically articulated symbols of 
the political Centre”.128 The main arguments and policies of PASOK were 
strengthened with the developments of 1970; particularly with the problems with 
Turkey in the Aegean, the Cyprus issue and as stated before with the attitude taken 
by the USA and EU towards the Turkish-Greek disputes. 
Against the slogan of Karamanlis ‘Greece belongs to the West’, 
Papandreou developed the slogan of ‘Greece belongs to Greeks’. The foreign 
policy of Papandreou was determined within this nationalist-conservative 
perspective. The harshest expressions were made between 1974-1981 when 
PASOK was in opposition in the parliament. It was being expressed –a situation 
either Karamanlis government or other Greek political parties also did not reject– 
that the main threat was from its NATO ally Turkey instead of the Soviet Union or 
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any other satellite Balkan country. This perception also formed the basis of 
security doctrine of PASOK in the 1980s. They had the promise of withdrawal 
from NATO, removal of US bases from Greek soil and a referendum on whether 
Greece remain a member of the European Common Market when they came to 
power.129 The anti-Americanism of the party was because of their belief that “CIA 
had been behind both the dictatorship and the earlier events of July 1965 when 
King Constantine had manoeuvred the legally elected Prime Minister, 
Papandreou’s father, into resigning”.130 The events of the 1967 coup, 1974 coup 
and Turkish intervention in Cyprus were seen as the results of American 
penetration and of the mono-dimensional and one-sided policy of previous 
governments.131 Because of its relatively more important strategic position, it was 
believed that Turkey was in a favored situation from the American point of view 
and this situation was damaging the Greek national interests. PASOK was not only 
against close relations with the USA, but also against any kind of American 
existence on Greek soil. They opposed the presence of US military facilities and 
nuclear weapons in Greece since they were causing danger for Greece in the event 
of a world war, limiting the possibilities for an independent foreign policy and it 
was even thought they could be used against Greece in the event of a Greek-
Turkish conflict.132 NATO, instead of making Greece feel more secure, was 
threatening because of the fact that Greek national interests were crushed under the 
priority of Turkish interests which were aligned with the American   interests.  
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PASOK did not have positive thoughts either about the EC. Seeing the EC 
as “common market of monopolistic capitalism”, PASOK was opposed to Greek 
membership in the Community.133 In addition to alleged economic damages it 
would cause to Greece, the dependency caused in foreign policy was the main 
reason that brought PASOK’s criticisms about membership. Besides them, just like 
the US, there was lack of confidence on EC about its attitude in Greek-Turkish 
disputes. Perceiving the Community as a “junior partner” of the USA, PASOK 
argued that the membership of Greece could be traded for concessions on Cyprus 
and the Aegean in favor of Turkish interests which would also satisfy the 
Americans.134 During the voting in the parliament about membership to the 
community, PASOK left the parliament in protest stating that “Greece ought to 
find some other arrangement to cooperate economically with the European 
Community”.135  For ‘other arrangement’, what PASOK favored was a ‘special 
relationship’ with the Community like the Norwegian example.136 In addition to 
this suggestion, it was believed that the decision of membership to the Community 
should have been taken as a result of a referendum where Greek citizens would 
directly decide about their destiny.  
Even though anti-thoughts about the US, NATO and EC were at the core of 
PASOK’s political stance and very bold commitments had been made during the 
election period, the policy-making of PASOK was not that bold. After the 1974 
Cyprus intervention, Greece had withdrawn from NATO’s military flank in protest 
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to the USA because Athens thought Washington favored Ankara over Athens. 
Since that time, Greece’s return was obstructed by the veto power used by Turkey. 
This situation was changed in 1980 after the military take over in Turkey. As a 
result of the efforts of American General Rogers, the head of the military junta 
General Kenan Evren accepted to pull back Turkey’s veto on Greece’s return to 
NATO’s military flank in return for bilateral negotiations between Greece and 
Turkey to solve the Aegean disputes.137 However, Turkey took this decision 
without putting any signatures under any document for the commitments. The 
situation that oral commitments between states do not actually give guarantees for 
the realization of those commitments came true for Turkey with the victory of 
PASOK in Greece. Despite the promises made to the Greek public about Greece’s 
withdrawal from NATO, Papandreou neither pulled Greece out, nor rejected 
returning to its military flank. Indeed, Greece turned back to military flank of 
NATO by the Rogers Plan but Papandreou rejected bilateral relations with Turkey 
for the solution of Aegean disputes.  
Not only the commitments about withdrawal from NATO, but also the ones 
for EC membership did not happen. When PASOK came to power in October 
1981, Greece had been an EC member state almost for 10 months. Neither a 
referendum for the continuing membership status was held, nor were any steps 
taken in the parliament to revise the membership of Greece with a special status. 
Indeed, especially for the first half of the 1980s, PASOK benefited from the 
membership with cash flowing from the Community.  
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While seeing the USA, NATO and EC as structures damaging to Greek 
national interests, Papandreou was advocating development of relations with the 
neighboring Soviet satellites and third world countries. By stating that “Greece 
belongs to the third-world periphery which is exploited by the capitalists of 
Western Europe and the United States”, Papandreou called all ‘non-aligned’ 
Mediterranean countries to join forces against Great Power influence”.138 Within 
the Mediterranean countries, he saw Turkey and Israel as two pillars of American 
influence in the region.  In addition to that, PASOK preferred developed relations 
with Palestine and Middle East countries especially with Iraq during their time of 
rule. In the first period of PASOK government, Yasser Arafat visited Greece and 
also Libya’s President Gaddafi was invited to Athens.139  
PASOK’s nationalism was clearly evident in Greek-Turkish issues and 
Cyprus.140 With the existence of the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus intervention, 
the source of threat was changed from the eastern bloc to Turkey. “PASOK 
assessed Turkey’s long-term objectives towards Greece as expansionist, aiming at 
the partition of the Aegean, and/or some other formula under which sovereignty 
could be shared by the two countries”.141 The Cyprus intervention was also 
perceived as an example of Turkish expansionism against Greece in addition to the 
efforts which had been made to change the status-quo in the Aegean. During its 
opposition in the parliament in the 1970s, PASOK was strongly criticizing 
Karamanlis’ government because of the ‘soft’ policies they were following 
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towards Turkey for EC membership. During the 1976 Aegean crisis created by the 
voyage of the Sismik 1 to carry out explorations between the islands of Lemnos 
and Mytilini, Papandreou called for the sinking of the ship while Karamanlis chose 
to apply to international authorities.142 For PASOK, no dialogue could be formed 
between Greece and Turkey as long as Turkey continued to keep soldiers on 
Cyprus and claimed sovereignty rights in the Aegean which was under Greek 
sovereignty. There was one issue in the Aegean needed to be solved and it was the 
continental shelf issue which should be taken to the ICJ. They argued that if 
Greece selected the way of bilateral negotiations, Athens would lose rights since it 
did not have any claims over areas under Turkish sovereignty.  
The uncompromising attitude of PASOK was reflected in the policies 
followed towards Turkey during the 1980s. The second half of the 1980s, was 
more dynamic. In 1987, Turkey and Greece lived a crisis in the Aegean that 
brought them to the edge of war. Immediately afterwards, Turkish application for 
full membership to the EC and a process of negotiation for the development of 
bilateral relations was started in Davos even though it did not last. 
For the Cyprus issue, just like the Aegean problems, Papandreou preferred 
a policy of internationalization of the issue. Instead of seeing the issue as one 
between Greece and Turkey or an issue within NATO, Papandreou saw the issue 
as one to be considered under UN decisions and in international conferences.143 
This is actually what the Greek Cypriots seemed to support, however, mostly in 
rhetoric. The uncompromising attitude of Greece and Greek Cypriots towards 
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peaceful solution has easily come out during the negotiations under the auspices of 
the UN and towards the plans proposed by UN since the 1980s. In addition to 
internationalization of the Cyprus issue under UN, it entered a new stage first with 
Greek membership to the community and Turkey’s will for accession, secondly 
with accession of Southern Cyprus as the legal government of the whole island.    
 
4.2.2. Özal Era and Turkey’s Application for Full Membership of the EC 
One of the main arguments today about Turkey’s relations with the EC in the 
1970s involves the question of why Turkey did not apply for full membership 
immediately after Greece in 1975 as it had done in the case of Association 
Agreement. The strongest supporter of membership application at the time of 
Greece’s membership was Ambassador Tevfik Saracoglu. According to Saracoglu, 
if Turkey had applied for membership along with Greece, the Community had to 
take Turkey in or leave Greece out.144 The main reasons given for the delay in 
Turkey’s application for full membership are the ones which mainly arose from 
domestic politics. “Domestic political instability and civilian unrest (…) under 
weak coalition governments” were the main reasons that kept Turkey away from 
that kind of application immediately after Greece.145 After Greek application for 
membership in 1975 until the date it became officially a member of the 
Community in 1981, five different governments were formed in Turkey. During 
their short-lived periods, it is possible to say that none of them could think of 
taking such a big step while there was political instability in the country. In 
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addition to this situation, relations with the Community were not positive. The 
view that Association with the EC was damaging Turkey’s economy and the need 
for more revisions and privileges was common in the Ecevit and Demirel 
governments.146 However, in the last government of the 1970s, which was 
established as minority government under Demirel’s premiership in November 
1979, it was possible to see the intention for full membership. This intention was 
reflected in the Association Council meetings of the 1980s however, no application 
was put forward.147 It can be argued that the situation could have been different if 
Demirel had established a majority government instead of the minority one 
supported by conservative right-wing parties of the parliament. The minister of 
Foreign Affairs Hayrettin Erkmen was a strong supporter of membership 
application before the Greek membership came into effect in January. However, 
because of the opposite attitude of National Salvation Party against the EC, Prime 
Minister Demirel preferred to postpone the application.148 Before taking steps on 
the way of application, relations were disrupted this time with the military coup of 
12 September 1980.  
It took three years to restore the civil regime in Turkey. The new 
constitution was more restrictive than the constitution of 1961 in terms of political 
and individual rights. Those restrictions would cause various problems in Turkey’s 
relations with the community during the 1990s and 2000s. The elections were 
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evaluated as a “pseudo-competitive and unfair transition election”149 This was the 
evaluation not only in Turkey, but also in the EC it was foreseen that the elections 
in Turkey would not be real democratic elections.150 Three political parties were 
allowed to join the elections. Two of them, Populist Party – Halkçı Parti (HP) and 
Nationalist Democracy Party – Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (MDP) were founded 
by the military. The other one was the Motherland Party, Anavatan Partisi, 
(ANAP) which was founded and led by Turgut Özal. As a result of the elections, 
the Özal Era with ANAP started in Turkey. It would not be wrong to say that in 
addition to changes in the international arena, the policies of Özal and his 
personality were affective in starting a new period in Turkey, influences of which 
can still be seen in Turkish politics.  
In order to understand the policy followed at the time of membership 
application, it will be helpful to examine the way Özal saw foreign affairs, EC and 
Turkey. Even though he was a new face in politics and ANAP did not have any 
official roots or bounds with pre-coup political parties, Özal had been “in the 
highest posts of the Turkish civilian bureaucracy, functioning as a technocrat 
working in electrification projects, in the directorship of the State Planning 
Organization (DPT), and finally as undersecretary of the prime minister’s office in 
1980”.151 He had studied in the USA and he was a strong “admirer of the 
American political, cultural and economic system”.152 According to Laçiner, his 
ideology consisted of “American secularism, American democracy, American 
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capitalism and American liberalism”.153 Different from the previous politicians, he 
was very courageous to follow policies which had not been followed before and 
brought new openings in Turkey’s political and economic relations with the world. 
While he was aiming at the development of economic relations with Middle 
Eastern countries, he also saw Turkey’s place within the EC. For Özal, the Turks 
were European Muslims; therefore they did not need to change mentality or 
civilization to be European.154 The ties between Europe and Turkey were based on 
secularism not religion and he saw this kind of relation more solid than religious 
ties.155
 For the “dying relations” with the EC, the solution of the Özal government 
was a “shock treatment”.156 Even though there were negative attitudes from the EC 
countries when Turkey gave signals of membership application, the official 
application was made on April 14, 1987. There were several economic and 
political reasons for Turkey’s haste. To start with the political reasons, there was 
the fear of being left out of European integration after the membership of Portugal 
and Spain because of increasing anti-enlargement voices in the Community.157 It 
should also be taken into account that, after the 1986 enlargement, Turkey was one 
of the three European-NATO countries besides Iceland and Norway which were 
not members of the Community. When it is thought that Iceland and Norway 
preferred to stay out of this integration process, Turkey seems to be the only 
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European country, a NATO ally to be left out of this process.158  Secondly, 
Turkey’s integration with Europe had been accepted as a natural result of its 
Westernization and modernization policies and there was the strong belief that this 
integration would bring political stability and help development of the democratic 
culture.159 In addition to that, the Greek factor should not be forgotten. From the 
time Greece had made application for full membership, there was the fear that 
Turkey’s relations with the Community would be negatively affected because of 
Greek veto and also bilateral problems with Greece would be transformed into 
Turkey’s problems with the Community. It became possible to see the negative 
effects of Greek membership since the first day of its membership and in order to 
not to let the gap between Greece and Turkey grow, and to counteract the relatively 
advantageous situation Greece had captured, Turkey’s application was urgent.  
Besides the political reasons, there were also economic reasons behind 
Turkey’s membership application. Because of the problematic situation in the 
relations between Turkey and the EC, none of the sides were implementing the 
responsibilities arising from agreements already signed. In addition, within Özal’s 
economic program, there was much need for foreign investments and credits. The 
fact that the EC had become an important economic power especially after 
participation of the UK, Özal saw EC membership vital for the new economic 
initiatives. Both in economic and political terms, EC had become indispensable 
and irreplaceable for Turkey.    
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4.2.3 The Reaction of EC and Greece towards Turkish Application 
After Greece’s application for membership in 1975, Turkey’s application was 
expected in Brussels as a natural development.160 Keeping this possibility in mind, 
Turkey was being warned in every opportunity that it had time to apply for 
membership. Because of the domestic developments, Turkish application for 
membership came in 1987.  
The application “met with an extremely unfavorable response”.161 Actually, 
it was still an application evaluated to be ‘early’ by the Community. The opinion 
of the Commission came in quite a long time.162 Two and a half years after the 
official application of Turkey, the Commission report reflecting its opinion about 
Turkey’s membership to the Community was issued. It can be easily stated that the 
report was prepared very carefully. It put out the reservations of the Commission 
about Turkey’s membership arising both from Turkey’s economic and political 
unpreparedness and from the deepening process the Community had already 
engaged. Explicitly, it is seen that the core reservations of EU today about 
Turkey’s membership had already existed in the Commission report of 1989 and 
during the time elapsed there was no progress on the issues pronounced years 
before. 
In the report, it was shown that the timing of the application was not right. 
Emphasizing “the further deepening and the completion of the Single Market by 
1992”, it was stated that “further enlargement of the community was not on the 
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agenda at the time of the application, at least until 1993”.163 This was the 
explanation proving the accuracy of Ambassador Saracoglu’s point of view.  He 
had emphasized that in addition to the preparedness of a country, the EC 
membership was an issue of conjecture; when the appropriate conjecture exists, 
membership occurs.164 For Turkey, the appropriate conjecture for Turkey’s 
membership had not come yet according to the Community or it had passed or lost 
according to Saracoglu.  
In addition to the reason derived from the deepening process that the 
community had already engaged, strong reasons questioning Turkey’s political and 
economic preparedness for the membership were overtly declared. Before the 
explanations questioning Turkey’s preparedness, the commission emphasized “in 
the particular case of Turkey” on “two aspects [which] are all the more 
significant”.165  Still continuing to be one of the main arguments about Turkey’s 
accession to the community, the Commission paid attention to the geographic area 
and the population of Turkey”. Even though these aspects have not been declared 
officially as obstacles for Turkey’s accession to the community, it is worth to 
express it that in the first formal document made about Turkey’s accession, the 
anxieties of the community deriving from Turkey’s unchangeable characteristics 
were quite clearly pointed out.  
Accepting the situation that there is no question about the eligibility of 
Turkey and the progress both in economic and politics terms achieved since 1980, 
the report was shaped around the ‘development gap’ between Turkey and the 
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Community average. This development gap was both within the economic and 
political contexts. Within the economic context, the community pointed out four 
kinds of difficulties to be overcome which were structural disparities in agriculture 
and industry, macro-economic imbalances, high levels of industrial protectionism, 
and low level of social protection.166 In addition, within the political context the 
attention of the Commission went to two main areas: human rights and respect for 
minorities, and problems with Greece and the Cyprus issue. Actually, they have 
continued to be the main focus areas in the more recent documents of the 
Community concerning Turkey’s progress for accession. In the report of 
Commission Opinion, emphasizing that there had been developments in the human 
rights situation and in respect for the identity of minorities, they were considered 
not enough to reach the level required in a democracy.167  
Under the title of political context, the other issue emphasized was 
Turkey’s problems with Greece and the Cyprus issue. With the words in the 
Commission Report: 
Examination of the political aspects of the accession of Turkey would 
be incomplete if it did not consider the negative effects of the dispute 
between Turkey and one Member State of the Community, and also 
the situation in Cyprus, on which the European Council has just 
expressed its concern once again.168
 
It should be remembered here that it had been stated both by Greece and by 
the Community just after the Greek application that Greece’s membership to the 
Community would not effect Turkey’s relations with the community and it was 
expressed by Turkey several times that not only Turkey’s relations with the 
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Community, but also Turkey’s bilateral relations with Greece would be seriously 
affected by Greece’s membership. This report vindicated Turkey’s anxieties and 
can be seen as an sign from the Community that “bilateral conflict between the two 
countries [Greece and Turkey] was no longer (…) a conflict between two major 
external partners which the EC would view from outside with a certain distance; 
rather the conflict was now between an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ and of direct and 
profound interest to the Community itself”.169 Within all those circumstances, the 
Commission expressed its opinion for further enlargement with Turkey that “the 
political and economic situation in Turkey [led] the Commission to believe that it 
would not be useful to open accession negotiations (…) straight away”.170 
However, besides its negative opinion about Turkey’s accession to the 
Community, it also recommended development of relations with Turkey and 
proposal of a series of substantial measures to enable both partners to enter on the 
road towards increased interdependence and integration bringing the completion of 
Customs Union.171  
Among the EC members, one of the most negative responses for Turkey’s 
application came from Greece.172 Greece responded negatively for the application 
“citing the poor record of Turkey on the issue of human rights, as well as the 
Turkish aggressive policy against Greece and the lack of progress on the issue of 
Cyprus”.173 Those issues would be the points that Greece would bring on the table 
in the future for a progress in Turkey’s relations with the EC. Questioning the 
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democratic level of the administration in Turkey, Greece aimed to block the 
application in the Council meeting before it was sent to the Commission for its 
opinion.174 In this case, Turkey’s adventures on the road to membership would be 
curtailed even before they started. Even though Greece had applied for 
membership only one year after returning to democracy in 1974 and membership 
was seen as a way to develop the democratic regime, existence of the same reason 
in Turkey’s application and the possibility that the Community would hold the 
same opinion with the one it had for Greece in the 1970s was ignored. Although 
there were views within the EC opposing to transference of Turkey’s application to 
the Commission for opinion, they could not be successful since the application was 
made according to article 238 of treaty of Rome just like the previous 
applications.175   
Actually it was not the first event showing negative attitude of Greece 
towards Turkey within the EC since 1981. During the 1980s, there were two main 
problems in the Community’s relations with Turkey: problems in the running of 
the Association Agreement and the meeting of the Association Council with 
Turkey after the return to democracy in Turkey. After becoming an EU member, 
Greece did not undersign Turkey’s Association Agreement with the Community. 
176 It meant that the already acquired rights of Turkey in the Ankara Agreement 
and in the Additional Protocol were blocked to run within the entire EC area as a 
result of the fact that the validity of the agreements were not approved for Greece. 
In addition to blocking the enforcement of the treaties within its borders, the 
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strongest objections came on the issue of financial cooperation by vetoing the grant 
of 600 million ECU (European Currency Unit) under the Fourth Financial 
Protocol.177 In addition, since 1980 the Association Council could be met at the 
ministerial level. About holding the meeting, Greece expressed that it was against 
meeting of the Council unless human rights and Cyprus issues were not 
included.178 The meeting of the Association Council was scheduled to take place 
on April 25, 1988. However, it was postponed when the Turkish delegation learnt 
that a statement that the Cyprus issue would be affecting Turkey’s relations with 
the Community had been put in the joint declaration of the Community as a result 
of Greek insistence.179  
 It can be said that the late Turkish application for EU membership gave 
Greece the strongest card to be used against Turkey, for obstructing Turkey’s 
membership to the Community with resolution of their bilateral disputes in the way 
Greece demanded. With its veto power on the Community’s decision, the policy of 
Athens was to mark that “the entry visa of Ankara was in the hands of Greece, and 
getting it was dependent on solution of the Cyprus issue”.180 By ‘the solution’, 
without doubt, withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus and reunification of the 
island under a federation which accepted existence of two communities but not 
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separate zones was implied. The Association Agreement of Turkey was signed by 
Greece on April 1988 a few months after the Davos process to be operational 
starting with the New Year. It should be noted that the Greek ‘concession’ came 
“after receiving concessions by Turkey on the issue of the Greek properties in 
Turkey”.181 The Turkish concession was a result of the Davos atmosphere 
reflecting Turkey’s goodwill for development of relations with Greece. The lifting 
of Greek veto, as a response, was a simple example of the policy where the EC 
membership card aimed to be used against Turkey concerning bilateral relations. 
There will be another example of it in the 1990s which would have complicated 
results for Turkey and bring more difficulties on the way to EC/EU, by taking 
Cyprus into the EU picture as a candidate country. 
Even though Greece had been showing itself, or shown, as “the only and 
main obstacle to the accession of Turkey into the Community”, it is not possible to 
state that the rest of the Community members were so eager to take Turkey in and 
that they were stopped by Greek veto.182 As it was stated in the Commission 
Report in 1989 quite clearly that Turkish political and economic deficiencies with 
its size and population excesses were the main problems pending before Turkey for 
obtaining membership. However, what was preferred was to show Greece as the 
“sole culprit” of the problematic relations with the Community since it was 
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convenient for EC in order not to offend the strategic country of the Eastern 
Mediterranean and for Greece as well to proof its power against Turkey.183  
 
4.2.4. Aegean Crisis of 1987 and the Davos Process 
Besides Turkey’s application for accession to the EC, there were three more events 
at the core of Greek-Turkish relations during the 1980s. They were: declaration of 
independence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, the 1987 Aegean 
crisis, and the Davos process. 
Just a few days after Özal’s victory in the 1983 November elections, the 
Turkish Federated State in Northern Cyprus declared its independence as the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).  This development was a turning 
point in the Cyprus issue. Even though it has only been recognized by Turkey, the 
Cyprus issue was not anymore an issue between the two communities but between 
two states on the island.184  
Since the 1976 crisis, “the most serious crisis in Greek-Turkish relations” 
broke out.185 Like the 1976 crisis, it came out because of continental shelf issue, 
particularly because of exploration of oil in disputed waters. Just in a few days, 
Greece and Turkey came to the edge of war just like it would re-occur in the 1996 
Kardak/Imia crisis. However, more than a military confrontation in the Aegean and 
a real threat of break of war between Greece and Turkey, there appears 
explanations and evaluations that the crisis was ‘created’ mostly by the rhetoric of 
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policy makers.186 The starting point of the 1987 crisis was the oil exploration 
program of Denison Mines Ltd. dated on March 28th. Denison Mines was an entity 
formed by a Canadian, two American, a German and a Greek company. Turkey 
opposed the exploration depending on the 1976 Bern Protocol between Greece and 
Turkey signed after the crisis of that year.187 According to the protocol, none of 
them would undertake any activity in the Aegean that would prejudice the 
settlement of the continental shelf dispute.188 Papandreou declaring the protocol 
inactive, expressed that “Greece had ‘sovereign rights’ over the continental shelf 
and Athens would decide ‘when, where and how it would explore the resources of 
the seabed”.189 Against the ‘offensive’ rhetoric of Greece, Turkey did not remain 
silent and on March 26th, it was stated by the Turkish officials “that the Sismik 1 
exploration vessel, accompanied by seven warships would conduct seismological 
surveys in the sections of international waters claimed by Turkey”.190 Two days 
later Sismik 1 sailed with two warships in the legally declared and recognized 
Turkish territorial waters. For 3 days the Greek forces stayed on alert. At the end, 
tension was calmed down, the forces on alert were sent back to their headquarters 
and the survey of Denison Marines was not conducted.  
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Actually more than the chronological escalation and de-escalation of the 
tension, the reasons should be examined to understand how so easily and quickly 
Turkey and Greece came to the edge of war and how the tension deflated like a 
balloon. It can be argued that more than military preparations, the rhetoric of the 
two countries were effective on the escalation of the tension. In his speeches 
Papandreou stated that Turkey was behaving in an aggressive way; NATO and 
particularly the USA were accused of the crisis since they did not stop Turkey. In 
one of his declarations, Papandreou put out clearly how the situation was perceived 
in Greece. The tension was seen as a game of Turkey supported by the USA and 
NATO to bring Greece to the negotiation table to cede its ‘sovereign rights’ in the 
Aegean.191 As a reaction to the USA and NATO, “the ambassadors of Warsaw 
Pact countries in Athens were briefed on the crisis in advance of their NATO 
counterparts”.192 Greece was drawing a picture of being alienated within the 
Western block and showing that it was not alone as it was thought by keeping 
close relations with the Warsaw Pact countries.  
On the Turkish side, it was being expressed that Greece was following 
expansionist policies, violating the Bern protocol, and causing trouble. Turkey 
would not step back but would defend its national interests even if it cost a war 
against Greece. Not so different from Greece, the public declarations were to show 
the strength of Turkey and the intention that they would not hesitate to go for war 
against Greece if its national interests were threatened. The timing of the crisis is 
worthy. It is argued that since Prime Minister Özal was out of Turkey for medical 
treatment and the military was heavily controlling the process was one of the 
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reasons for the high tension created.193 While making preparations for membership 
application to the EC, it can be argued that Özal would have avoided being 
involved in crisis with Greece in order not to strengthen their veto possibility.194  
It is clear that neither Greece nor Turkey had the aim of starting a military 
conflict. Greece had offensive preparations even though “the Turkish armed forces 
did not constitute an imminent threat” despite the tough rhetoric of Ankara.195  On 
the Turkish side, there was not a serious military preparation. This was shown by 
the sailing of Sisimik 1 with two warships instead of seven as it had been declared. 
As the crisis was created mostly by the discourses, tension was de-escalated again 
by the words of leaders. Prime Minister Özal stated on BBC while he was 
returning to Turkey that there was no reason for tension because Turkey would not 
proceed to explore in the disputed areas if Greece would also not initiate 
exploration.196 In addition to the discourse of Özal and the survey of Sismik 1 
within Turkish territorial waters, Kalaitzaki argues that there was effective NATO 
mediation on the subsidence of the crisis.197 There is also literature arguing that the 
crisis was ended as a result of ‘successful deterrence’. It is equally possible to face 
arguments supporting both Greece and Turkey about deterrence.  However, for 
Turkey it seems a small possibility to see the military force of Greece as a deterrent 
power when the volume of military force is taken into consideration. On the other 
hand, for Greece it again seems that there was not a military deterrence from 
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Turkey making it step back at the time of the crisis since there was no military 
preparation parallel with the tough discourses of Turkey. For Turkey, the main 
deterrence can be thought to be involved in a crisis with an EC member at a time 
when application was about to be made. For Greece, it was sure that fighting 
against Turkey with its relatively weak economic and military power at a time 
when anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-European attitude was strong would not 
bring any profits at the end of the day.  
The last important development for Turkish-Greek relations of the 1980s 
was the bilateral meetings between Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers starting in 
January 1988 during the meeting of World Economic Forum in Davos. Named as 
the Davos process, the bilateral negotiations which had big expectations ended in 
an unexpected way. After that, within the ‘spirit of Davos’, Papandreou and Özal 
came together two more times, one in Brussels in March and the other in Athens as 
a result of Özal’s visit. To the question why the Davos process started in 1988, 
there are quite many answers helpful to draw the picture of the time. Actually, the 
process did not suddenly start in 1988 only because of the 1987 crisis. The crisis 
was the accelerator reason of the Davos process but was not the only one. For the 
creation of the Davos spirit the personal role of the leaders and especially of Özal 
cannot be neglected. Since the establishment of the Özal government, he 
“repeatedly offered to open talks with the Greek government about all issues –
especially cooperation in the spheres of economics and tourism –without any 
preconditions”198. However, there were not impending conditions for Greece to 
                                                 
198 Heinz Kramer, “Turkey’s Relations with Greece: Motives and Interets”, in The Greek- Turkish 
Conflict i the 1990s domestic and External Influences, ed. Dimitri Constas (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1991), 66. 
 76
start talks with Turkey especially at a time when PASOK had come to power with 
its harsh discourse against Turkey. While Turkey was willing to start talks without 
any preconditions, Papandreou expressed several times that a dialogue could not be 
started before the Turkish troops in Cyprus left the island. After the 1987 crisis, the 
coercive reasons for Greece were also on the surface even though they were not 
recognized by many Greek officials, the press and public.  
The common reason behind the ‘Davos spirit’ was that lack of dialogue had 
been bringing crises and the last example was one of 1987.199 Hence, Papandreou 
and Özal made a joint statement in Davos emphasizing “the need to avoid the kind 
of confrontation that, in March 1987, had brought them to the verge of war”.200 In 
addition to that, for Greece, the second half of the 1980s was not as easy as the first 
half. Especially, existence of economic problems, the austerity policy to reach to 
level of other EC countries, and the need to use money in the fields outside 
military pressed Papandreou to take steps to decrease the tension caused by the 
discourse of ‘Turkish threat’. Coufoudakis also argues that “Papandreou may have 
wished to disprove Western and Turkish allegations as to his intransigence and of 
using Greek-Turkish issues for domestic purposes”.201 For the Turkish side, the 
main reason to start a dialogue with Greece was to eliminate “one of the obstacles 
to increased US military and economic assistance and to her EC membership 
application”.202
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 However, both Greece and Turkey had very valid reasons to start a 
continuous dialogue in 1988 but the failure of the process could not be prevented. 
The main reason given for the failure is the situation that the spirit could not be 
spread within the general climate including the politicians, officials, press and the 
publics. Özal’s visit to Athens on June 13th, which was the first visit after 35 years 
at the level of prime ministers, faced with demonstrations. Even though the crowd 
did not only consist of Greeks and Greek Cypriots –because there were also 
“Kurds and Armenians” protesting Özal– it had vital importance on the loss of the 
Davos spirit.203 The attitude of the Greek public had already been reflected in the 
polls which were made a few days before Özal’s arrival in Athens. According to 
one poll, only one-third of the Greek public supported rapprochement, in another 
one it was indicated that 30% saw Özal’s visit to Athens as ‘provocation’.204 The 
Greek press held a positive or at least a neutral attitude towards the rapprochement. 
The Press preferred a critical attitude expressing Davos as a ‘mistake’ and accused 
Papandreou of starting talks without realization of the precondition of withdrawal 
of Turkish troops from Cyprus.205  
Discontent of the Greek public was expressed in the general elections and 
in April 1990, Greece started the new decade with a new government established 
this time by the New Democracy Party under the leadership of Constantine 
Mitsotakis. Even though rapprochement with Turkey was not the only reason of 
defeat of PASOK, the timing of the process had speeded it up. In Turkey there was 
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also important change in domestic politics. Prime Minister Özal became the new 
president of Turkey in November 1989. Until his death in 1993, he served as 
president. His presidency showed the end of Özal factor in active political life and 
started a new era both for ANAP and Turkey.   
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
  
GREECE WITHIN THE ‘NEW WORLD ORDER’ 
 
 
 
After Greece became a member of the EC in 1981, a new period started for 
Turkish-Greek relations. During the 1980s, Greece used its membership to the 
Community to block Turkey’s relations with the Community, particularly by 
vetoing the financial packages and obstructing the Association Council meetings. 
This policy changed in the 1990s depending on the changes in the international 
environment and especially in PASOK. The core aim of this chapter is to analyze 
the Greek policy towards Turkey during the 1990s. In order to have a thorough 
understanding of it, the changes in the international system and changes in the 
Greece’s security perceptions depending on existence of new independent states in 
the Balkans will be examined. While there was not a big shift in the Greece’s 
policy towards Turkey during the first half of the 1990s, the change occurred in the 
second half of the decade bringing Turkey candidacy for EU membership. While 
the reasons behind the shift in the Greek policies towards Turkey are discussed, the 
major events of Turkey-Greece-EU triangle, such as the crises in Turkish-Greek 
relations and related EU Summits, will be represented.   
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5.1 Greek Foreign Policy Priorities during the 1990-1995 Period    
 
5.1.1 The Broad Picture at the Beginning of the 1990s 
The 1990s was not a simple start of a new decade for the whole world. Actually the 
change had started within the second half of the 1980s with the Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika –restructuring– and glasnost –opening 
up– which were introduced in 1985 to bring reorganization for a better 
performance of the communist regime. However, instead of bringing a new breath 
in the system, his policies accelerated the process of dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the ruin of communist ideology.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a very different world map. Even 
though it is named as ‘new world order’, it could just as well be named as the “new 
world disorder”.206 Political disorder, ethnic-religious clashes and economic 
collapse in the Balkans, Middle East and the Caucasus were the issues to engage 
the world agenda. Greece and Turkey were the two countries of the Western block, 
now at the center of fire. Being surrendered with countries of disorder and ethnic 
clashes, they faced new threats and even new opportunities within the new system. 
At the very beginnings of the decade with astonishment, both Greece and Turkey 
held the view that they lost their strategic importance with disappearance of 
Communist threat. However, it was quickly cast away with the break of the Gulf 
War and the importance of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle 
East in particular for the USA. Greece and Turkey were no more two states to 
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prevent Soviet expansion throughout the Eastern Mediterranean but now they were 
perceived as bridges between the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus.207 While 
facing disorder, wars, and instabilities around themselves, there were also 
opportunities for new openings for their foreign relations with the existence of 
independent states in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. By looking around 
from the glasses of active involvement in international arena, the famous Turkish 
statement of “Adriyatik’ten Çin Seddi’ne Türk Dünyası” –Turkic World from the 
Adriatic to the Great Wall of China– came out.208 With the fear of encirclement by 
Turkey, Greece also followed policies to circle Turkey to limit its area of 
influence.  
 
5.1.2. Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans during the 1990-1995 Period 
The collapse of communism did not bring any decrease in the strategic importance 
of Turkey for the Western world, in particular for the USA. Instead, it opened the 
way for new relations for Turkey putting Greece on alarm. Not only did this 
situation have influence on the bilateral relations of the two countries, but it closely 
influenced the general foreign policy formation of Greece. In order to narrow down 
Turkey’s area of influence and prevent its free movement, Greece chose to follow 
a containment policy in the Balkans, Caucasus and in the Middle East. The 
Balkans had already been seen as a natural area of influence area for Greece since 
it was the only Balkan country at the same time member of the EU and NATO. 
However, a constructive role could not be assumed within the perception of natural 
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area of influence immediately at the beginning of 1990s because of problems with 
the newly independent states in the region, namely Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania. The tension in the Balkans was accelerated 
with the uncompromising and combative policies of PASOK followed to solve the 
problems with FYROM and Albania and with the attitude taken during the 
Croatian and Bosnian crises.  
It has been argued that it was not the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but 
the collapse of Yugoslavia that created the real challenge to Greek security.209 The 
existence of new independent states in the Balkans was an opportunity to develop 
relations with those countries but also a source of new threats and disputes for 
Greece. The Macedonian Question and the problems with Albania took priority in 
the Greek agenda next to disputes with Turkey during the first half of the 1990s.  
Since the date FYROM declared independence with the name ‘Republic of 
Macedonia’ in September 1991, Greece rejected recognition and followed a policy 
of obstruction of its international recognition unless the official name of the 
country was changed, the irredentist articles in the constitution were abolished and 
the usage of Greek symbols as symbols of a different Macedonian identity were 
abandoned.210 For the solution of disputes with the new neighbor, Greece preferred 
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tough policies and tension was accelerated with PASOK’s return to power in 1993. 
The policy of blocking its entry into the UN and recognition by the international 
community especially by the EU countries was supported with a unilateral trade 
embargo. The name issue was overcome with development of a temporary name, 
‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’. Macedonia entered into the UN with 
this name and today still continues to use it since an agreement with Greece on the 
name has not been reached. The uncompromising attitude of Greece, particularly 
the introduction of trade embargo damaged Greece’s international image and 
raised questions in Europe about its role in the European system especially as it 
coincided with the Greek Presidency of the EU. The European Commission 
brought a lawsuit against Greece before the European Court of Justice arguing that 
it violated the Treaty of Rome by breaking EU rules which prohibited a member 
state from unilaterally closing one of the EU’s external borders.211 The problems 
were half-solved with mediation of the USA however it left the name issue 
pending. The main reason behind the success of US mediation can be explained 
with the growing perception inside and outside the EU that Greece was the spoiled 
child of Europe and needed to be kept under control, and its isolation within the 
international community –a situation decreasing Greece’s effectiveness on issues 
where it had vital interests. With the Interim Accord signed in September 1995, 
normalization of diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries 
started with lifting of the embargo on FYROM in return of change in FYROM’s 
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flag and abolishment of the irredentist articles of the constitution, leaving the name 
issue for a future date.212  
Even though Albania was not a new neighbor, the changing political system 
bore new problems with Greece. The problems were the illegal immigration from 
Albania to Greece and the worsening conditions of the Greek minority in Albania. 
With the collapse of the communist regime in 1990, thousands of Albanian citizens 
left the country in the direction to Italy and Greece.213 For Greece, the problems 
occurred because of illegal migration which started to bring social and economic 
problems in a short time.  In addition to illegal migration, relations were affected 
negatively because of the treatment of the Greek minority in Albania. The relations 
were at the lowest level with the conviction and long prison sentences given to five 
members Omonia, the Greek rights organization in Albania, because of a terrorist 
attack on an Albanian military camp in 1994.214 As a response, Greece vetoed the 
EU aid package to Albania until the prisoners were freed in 1995 as a result of 
international pressure.  
Besides the problematic relations with Albania and FYROM, the Balkan 
policy of Greece was clearly pro-Serbian which was shown during the crises of 
Croatia and Bosnia. During the wars, Greece acted in defiance of the arms 
embargo imposed on all of former Yugoslavia as a result of UN Security Council 
Resolution 713 and provided all kinds of support for the Serbs. This policy was 
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strongly inspired by the historical relations between the Serbs and Greeks. 
However, another reason behind this policy was “to do the opposite of the policies 
that Turkey had been following”.215 It resulted from the fear of encirclement by a 
“Muslim arch”, which would be led by Turkey and contain Albania, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bulgaria because of their Muslim populations.216 
However, instead of being advantageous, the pro-Serbian policy of Greece caused 
reaction from the European countries and as a result of being the only country 
within the EU to give support to Serbian activities Athens “was accused of 
behaving like a ‘Balkan’ country more than a ‘European’ one”.217   
Besides the Balkans, Greece continued its encirclement policy in other 
regions where Turkey had new neighbors.  In the same logic with pro-Serbian 
policy, Greece followed a policy of development of relations with the neighboring 
countries of Turkey with which it could not yet establish trustful and stable 
relationships. Among those countries, Russia, Syria, Armenia, and Iran came 
first.218 With the point of view that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, Greece 
followed a policy of forming economic, political and even military relations with 
those countries to narrow Turkey’s area of influence, and was successful in causing 
anxieties in Turkey.219 The same reason lied behind Greece’s relations with the 
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terrorist group PKK which would come to an end with the capture of PKK’s leader 
Öcalan, in the Greek Embassy in Kenya.   
Not only with the countries that Turkey had problems, but also with the 
Turkic Republics and Caucasian states with whom Turkey succeeded in 
establishing healthier relations, Greece followed a policy of forming friendly 
relations in order to prevent Turkey from being one step further.  
 
5.1.3. Relations with Turkey: Turkey within Greece, EU and Cyprus Triangle  
The first half of the 1990s did not bring any development in Turkish-Greek 
relations since there was not any change in the way Greece perceived its Eastern 
neighbor. Moreover, the ‘Turkish threat’ was strengthened with the fear of being 
surrounded by a Muslim arch led by Turkey whose strategic importance was 
accelerating because of the instabilities and disorders in its neighborhood where 
the USA had vital interests. Not only Turkey but also reconciliation between 
Greece and Turkey, at least prevention of conflict or clash, were very important for 
US interests in the region. For this reason, just like in the previous years, the USA 
continued to be one of the main actors of mediation between Greece and Turkey at 
times of crises.  
In those circumstances, Turkey’s place in Greek foreign and defense 
policies did not change. Although the end of the Cold War allowed many countries 
to plan arms reductions, it had the opposite effect in case of Greece since the 
military expenditures continued to increase deterrence against the possibility of a 
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Turkish attack.220 Because of not being able to get involved in a ‘quantitative race’ 
–it was apparent that Greece was not able to provide a deterring power against 
Turkey in terms of numbers– with the provision of new technologies in military 
equipments, strategic and military agreements, Greece intended to provide a 
‘qualitative military power’.221 About the qualitative improvement of Greek armed 
forces, Greek Minister of National Defense Akis Tsohatzopoulos stated that: 
Considering the dimensions of our country, the condition of our 
economy and the demographic problem, quantitative armament 
competition with any hostile power would constitute a particularly 
costly effort for Greece with an uncertain outcome. Emphasis, therefore, 
should be put on quality, by adopting a modern strategic and operational 
doctrine (with emphasis on combined/joint operations), improving 
personnel training, restructuring combat units (with the aim of 
successfully carrying out defensive operations, but also with the ability 
to transfer operations on enemy territory), obtaining the necessary 
modern weapon systems (smart weapons and especially force 
multipliers), and rapidly integrating them in our Armed Forces. 222  
 
 
Within this context, the military-defense rapprochements with Russia, Iran, 
Syria, and Armenia can be seen as an important part in the formation of qualitative 
power. A short time after the New Democracy came to power in 1990, a Defense 
and Cooperation Agreement which was negotiated in the 1980s, was signed with 
the USA. With the agreement the status of the American bases in Greece was 
cleared and also it was perceived by Greece as balancing political and military 
power with Turkey.223  
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One of the interesting points of Post-Cold War Greek defense policy was 
the Doctrine of Joint Defense Area which put Cyprus directly inside the Greek 
defense zone. It was “a policy of extended deterrence” with a “clearly defensive 
character” to prevent aggression from Turkey by “improving co-operation and 
common training between the armed forces of Greece and Cyprus”.224 According 
to the Doctrine, as long as Turkey maintained an ‘occupation’ force of more than 
30,000 troops in Cyprus, Greek and Cypriot defenses would increase their level of 
co-operation. In this context, any attack against the Republic of Cyprus would 
constitute a casus belli for Greece.225   
The other development at the beginning of the 1990s evaluated from Greek 
point of view as a ‘victory’ was its membership to Western European Union in 
1992. In 1988, first Turkey and then Greece had expressed their intention to join 
the organization and it resulted in 1995 with Greece’s membership to the Union 
being the last member of it till today.226 Greece’s application to join the WEU was 
motivated mainly by its aim to gain greater West European support for its position 
vis-à-vis Turkey.227 However, WEU membership was not a military guarantee 
which can be used in case of a Turkish attack. According to EC’s decision at 
Maastricht that Article 5 of the modified Treaty of Brussels, which provides a 
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security guarantee in case of attack on members, does not apply between member 
states of NATO and WEU.228 It may be thought that this decision was taken to 
prevent a conflict between NATO and WEU because of problematic Greek-
Turkish relations. It is argued by Veremis that this decision has somewhat 
diminished the importance of WEU membership from the Greek point of view.229 
However, it may also be argued that with the development of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy within the deepening process of the Union, the role of WEU 
especially for Greece and Turkey was revived since there were efforts in the EU to 
“incorporate WEU into its new European Security and Defense Policy”.230   
Within Turkey-centric foreign and defense policies of Greece, one of the 
strongest trump cards continued to be its EC membership. During the first half of 
the 1990s, there was not a change in Greece’s policy of usage of this card. The way 
of “blocking the deepening of Europe’s relations with Turkey as a means of getting 
concessions from the latter on Greek-Turkish disputes” continued.231 Because of 
this policy until 1996, Veremis’ argument seems very strong that “the use of the 
EU lever as a short-term instrument of pressure against Turkey seemed attractive 
and also politically less risky and more rewarding.”232  
The 1990s were important years in terms of both deepening and widening 
of the Community. 233 With the Maastricht Treaty, known as the Treaty of 
European Union signed in 1991 and came into effect in 1993, structural change 
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was brought to the Community. Inspired by the appearance of ancient Greek 
temples, the new structure of the Community was settled on three pillars forming 
the European Union.234 It was a big step taken by the Community on the way of 
political union in addition to economic and monetary integration. In terms of 
Turkey’s relations with the Union, the Treaty bore two crucial results: The WEU, 
which Turkey was not a full member, was put in a position of implementation 
body of Common Foreign and Defense Policy of the Union and the approval of the 
European Parliament was made compulsory for further enlargement.235
The collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe with the 
existence of newly independent states in the Balkans –which were identified as 
‘Southeast European countries’ within their ‘Europeanization’ processes– brought 
new venues for widening of the European Union. Bringing re-determination of the 
EU’s enlargement policy, it also closely affected Turkey’s progress on the way of 
membership in some future. Besides economic, political and security reasons, 
incorporation of those countries, which also had historical and cultural importance 
for the Community, in the European integration process was embraced by all of the 
Community members.236 The widening plans of the Union were mainly prepared 
according to those countries putting Turkey in the waiting room for some more 
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time at a time when louder voices questioning Turkey’s place in the European 
identity and culture started to be heard.  
There were two more developments in the first half of the 1990s 
fundamentally affecting Turkey’s relations with the Community in the long run: 
the Copenhagen Summit of the EU which brought economic and political criteria 
for future enlargement of the Community and the membership application of Greek 
Cypriots on behalf of the whole island. In the Copenhagen Council meeting of the 
EU on June 21st and 22nd, 1993, crucial decisions were taken to be effective on the 
future enlargement processes. It was stated that the accession of an associated 
country depended on its “ability to assume the obligations of membership by 
satisfying the economic and political conditions required”.237 As the economic and 
political conditions that a candidate country needed to achieve for membership, the 
Council determined “the  stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union”.238 In addition to those criteria which 
were actually in the hands of the candidate countries to fulfill or not, one more 
thing was also expressed in the Conclusions of the Presidency, “as an important 
consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate 
countries”; which was “the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while 
maintaining the momentum of the European integration”.239  
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It can be easily argued that this point was visible in the relations of the 
Community with Turkey since formal application was made in 1987 and it was 
reflected explicitly in the Commission report of 1989. The Union’s reservations 
arising from Turkey’s size, population and identity continued to be effective on the 
progress of relations during the 1990s. The aim of the process was successfully 
turned by the Community into reaching a Customs Union though, keeping the final 
aim as Turkey’s full membership without pointing to specific date.  
Actually, the idea of Customs Union had appeared in the minds of 
Europeans after Turkey’s formal application for membership. In his meeting with 
Prime Minister Özal in Turkey in 1988, former President of France, Raymond 
Barre, suggested that Turkey sign the Customs Union since a positive outcome 
could not come for its membership application under these circumstances. As it 
was cited by Barre: 
Be realistic and put into effect the Customs Union which is also 
included in the agreements already signed. A country signed Customs 
Union cannot be left out, full membership will be indispensable. Also, 
Greece cannot veto it since it appears in their agreements. 240
 
 The will for a Customs Union with Turkey to be concluded by the end of 
1995 was declared within the Cooperation Package, known as ‘Matutes Package’ 
unveiled in 1990, but its adoption faced Greek veto in the Council.241 Like in the 
previous years Greece used its veto power to block Turkey-EU relations and 
dropped it again with a concession, which was acceptance of Cyprus as a candidate 
country –a concession to change the color of relations between Turkey and the 
Union in the following years. 
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From Turkey’s point of view, there were political and economic reasons 
behind the will to sign the Customs Union. First of all, with economic cooperation 
under a Customs Union, the ‘infrastructural integration’ with the Union would be 
provided and ‘political integration’ would be facilitated.242 Fresh air would be 
blown into the stagnant relations and membership would be indispensable. As it 
was commonly evaluated, with the Customs Union, Turkey would enter the Union 
“from the postern”.243 In terms of economic reasons, it was thought to bring 
stability in macro economics, open the way for foreign investments, increase the 
quality and the quantity of production since there would be production for a larger 
market and increased competition with European firms.244     
Even though there was strong will for a Customs Union both from the 
Union and Turkey, it was not called into being painlessly because of the Greek 
veto. Using its privileged position provided by membership status, a crucial 
concession was received in return of lifting the veto. Greek Cypriots applied for 
EU membership in 1990 representing the whole Cyprus with the title of the 
‘Republic of Cyprus’. Turkey’s response to it was shaped around emphasis on the 
empty words of the application and warnings of integration with TRNC.245 During 
high tension, the Union avoided an immediate response to the application and 
preferred to keep silent. The response of the EU came in 1993 with the 
Commission report which expressed the eligibility of Cyprus for membership with 
the belief that “the political and economic advantages of EU accession would 
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provide an incentive for a settlement.”246 For the progress of the process, the 
strongest supporter was Greece while stronger opposition came from Turkey. 
Signing of the Customs Union was bound to opening the way for Cyprus’ 
membership. The Greek veto continued until the last moment when preparations 
were completed for signatures,. The meeting of Association Council on December 
19, 1994 could not be realized because of the Greek veto showing up one more 
time “that the key was in the hands of Greece and they would not give the green 
light before a date was taken for Cyprus”.247 The deadlock ended with resignations 
of Turkey and the EU to Greek demand. The Customs Union, which would be 
effective starting 1996, could be signed in the Association Council meeting on 6 
March 1995, with the EU announcement that “accession negotiations with Cyprus 
would start six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Inter-Governmental 
Conference”.248 However, even though the Greek veto on Customs Union was 
lifted, it did not mean a total end of Greek vetoes. The financial aid package of the 
EU under the Customs Union Agreement for Turkey was blocked by Greece and 
kept as a trump card for the resolution of Aegean disputes.249 This situation was 
explicitly expressed by Prime Minister Kostas Simitis in 1997 to Newsweek. As a 
response to the question whether Greece would release its veto over EU funds 
owed Turkey if the Kardak/Imia dispute was solved, Simitis said that “If [Turkish 
Prime Minister] Mesut Yilmaz says clearly that he refers the matter to the 
International Court, he will get the money”.250
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With the signing of the Customs Union, the last phase of the Association 
Agreement began which included free movement of capital, services and persons 
in addition to goods, adjustment to the Common Agriculture Policy of the Union 
and remaining preparations for full membership which was the final aim of the 
Association relationship.251  
 
5.2 Change in PASOK, Change in Greece (1996-1999) 
 
5.2.1. Premiership of Kostas Simitis and the European Vision in Greek 
Politics 
The year 1996 started with a change for PASOK which would also bring change in 
every aspect of Greek politics from domestic politics to foreign relations in the 
coming years. As a result of resignation of Prime Minister Papandreou from 
premiership because of health problems, he was replaced by Kostas Simitis who 
had served in different ministerial posts in every PASOK government and was 
seen as “the head of party’s reformist wing”.252 Holding the title of “party rebel”, 
he had “resigned from Cabinet posts twice after opposing Papandreou’s economic 
policies”.253 His election was evaluated as the completion of “the transfer of power 
to a younger generation of Greek political leaders, less charismatic than their 
predecessors but more in tune with the rest of Europe”.254
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With the simplest expression, Simitis aimed at “bringing Greece closer to 
Europe”.255 The priority of the new PASOK administration was to bring reforms in 
the economic structure of the country and to take it to the level of other European 
countries.256 “After 1996, accession to the Eurozone came to be (…) a national 
goal in Greece, upon whose realization the prestige of the country and its national 
pride depended.”257 In terms of foreign policy, Simitis aimed to break the title of 
‘spoiled child of Europe’ and to take its place among the ‘core’ states of the 
European Union by following more constructive policies in the Balkans. Being the 
only EU and NATO member among the Balkan countries, Greece created for itself 
the mission of taking place at the center of EU stability policies for the region by 
becoming one of the strongest supporters of integration with EU and NATO.258 
Within this point of view, relations with the Balkan countries were put on a 
developing schedule especially in terms of economic relations with increase in 
trade volumes and Greek investments in those countries.259  
The policy towards Turkey was also closely affected by the moderate 
approach of PASOK. High military expenses, which formed an indispensable part 
in the post-1974 Greek defense policies, were a huge obstacle before Greece to 
reach the level of economical development of most European countries. Curtailing 
military expenses was directly linked with relations with its neighboring countries, 
                                                 
255 Kerin Hope, “The Simitis Era Begins”, Europe, issue 353, Feb 1996. 
256 In February 1996, Greece had the highest inflation rate, highest budget deficit, biggest national-
debt ratio, lowest productivity, the worst trade balance and the growth rate over the last 15 years at 
the half of EU average. See, “A Glam of Hope in Greece”, Economist 338, issue 7954, Feb 2, 1996.  
257 Rumelili, 12.  
258 Büyükçolak, 120-121.  
259 For detailed information about Greece economic relations with the Balkan countries, see 
Charalambos Tsardanidis and Evagelos Karafotakis, “Greece’s Economic Diplomacy towards the 
Balkan Countries”, http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/volume5/september- 
november2000/volumevn3charalambos.pdf (accessed April 21, 2008). 
 97
in particular with Turkey, which had been sitting at the core of its defense and 
foreign policies, forming the main threat to the country for more than two decades. 
In addition to the need of cutting down military expenses, with the policy of 
erasing the image of ‘Europe’s spoiled child’, adopting a moderate attitude in 
relations with Turkey was also crucial. It would rescue Greece from being the 
‘scapegoat of the Union’ by bringing on the scene the other countries which had 
been against Turkey’s membership but were hidden behind Greek vetoes. 
Moreover, for Greece “A European Turkey [would] be a much easier neighbor to 
live [with] than an isolated and militarized Turkey”.260 It would be much easier to 
deal with a Turkey progressing on the way of EU membership according to the 
criteria set by the Union. Making the EU an active part in the bilateral disputes 
rather than using its membership as a veto machine against Turkey would not only 
facilitate Greece’s work but also transform Turkish-Greek disputes into conditions 
needed to be realized by Turkey for EU membership.  
However, the obvious reflection of moderate policies in relations with 
Turkey were to be postponed for some more time because of the military 
confrontation in the Aegean and the cropping up of the Greek support behind the 
terrorist group PKK by the capture of Öcalan at the Greek Embassy, Kenya. 
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5.2.2. The Long Three-Years of Turkey between Greece and the EU  
 
5.2.2.1 Sovereignty Dispute in the Aegean: Kardak/Imia Crisis 
Only a few days after Simitis was elected as the new Greek Prime Minister, one of 
the most important events in recent Turkish-Greek relations broke out. Defined as 
“the first Turkish–Greek media war in the history”, Turkey and Greece found 
themselves suddenly in a military confrontation because of disagreement about the 
sovereignty of a pair of rocky islets, called Kardak in Turkish and Imia in Greek, 
3.8 n.m. away from Turkish coasts.261 At the time when a Turkish coaster ran 
aground over those islets “nobody could see that simple incident would start a 
series of events that brought two allies to the edge of war”.262 Tension was 
accelerated by exaggerated attention of the media in both of the countries and by 
the discourses used both by the politicians and journalists.263 The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the new cabinet under Simitis’ premiership, Theodoros 
Pangalos stated that “it was the first time that Turkey demanded territory from 
Greece”.264 Even though Simitis was brought to power for his moderate approach 
aiming to bring change in Greek politics, he could not keep away from following 
the traditionalist route since he did not want to be the focus of  intense critiques 
just before getting the vote of confidence.265 The ‘flag race’ on the islets brought 
harsh discourses of the two prime ministers. As a response to Simitis’ promise that 
the Greek flag would not be taken back, tension was accelerated with the words of 
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Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller that the Greek flag would be taken down and 
the troops would leave.266 It cannot be known how the crisis would develop if the 
two countries were not in the strategically important Mediterranean region. Like in 
many Turkish-Greek crises, this one was also cooled down by US mediation. 
American position accepted by the parties of the conflict was that “in case of not 
opening fire against the Turkish soldiers and if the Greek military force withdraws 
its presence and the Greek flag, the Turkish military forces will do the same”.267 
Eventually, the crisis ended without any shooting at one another and without 
bringing any clear agreement on the status of the rocks.  
 Kardak/Imia crisis was not the first crisis of short and high tension that 
brought Turkey and Greece almost war, but it also crated a new dimension within 
the frame of Aegean disputes.268 Even though it was evaluated by the foreign press 
as Greece and Turkey were fighting over the sovereignty of an uninhabited rocky 
islet, the situation that there are hundreds and maybe thousands of islets and rocks 
in the Aegean makes it important. After the crisis, the concept of ‘grey zones’ was 
brought on the table by Turkey stating that there were islets and rocks in the 
Aegean, whose belongings were not declared in the treaties. Greece, on the other 
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hand, opposed this point of view by stating that the signed treaties were clear 
enough to declare the sovereignty rights in the Aegean.269  
The attitude taken by the EU Commission about the Kardak/Imia Crisis 
was significant. The first step was taken on the way of pulling Turkish-Greek 
disputes within the EU.270 In the declaration of the Commission after the Crisis, it 
was expressed that the southern borders of the Union were Greek borders and the 
Union was in solidarity with Greece; it was reminded within the Customs Union 
frame that high level relations were aimed with Turkey and at the base of those 
relations were democratic principles, respect for international law and non-use of 
force.271  
The new Greek policy was effective in bringing an immediate change in the 
Turkish point of view regarding third party interventions.  The new Turkish Prime 
Minister Mesut Yılmaz declared on March 24th, Turkey “would not rule out third-
party solutions in the Aegean if all the interrelated issues were treated as a 
package”.272 It was a step taken towards the Greek solution however; the point of 
existence of other disagreements besides the continental shelf issue did not change. 
This step taken did not bring a positive attitude from Greece because it was 
conditional. However, it was obvious that the declaration of the Commission 
pointed out the new Greek policy vis-à-vis Turkey was effective. The 
Commission’s declaration was shared by the Council and a similar emphasis took 
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place in the General Affairs Council Declaration of 15 July 1996. In the 
declaration it was specified that Turkey-EU relations “should be based on a clear 
commitment to the principles and respect of international law and agreements, and 
that disputes created by territorial claims should be referred to the International 
Court of Justice”.273 Since then, the Aegean disputes started to take place in the 
official documents of EU under the title of ‘Turkey’ emphasizing the need for 
more efforts for the settlement of the disputes as well as the Cyprus issue in 
accordance with UN resolutions.  
 
5.2.2.2 S-300 Missile Crisis 
Shortly after the Kardak/Imia crisis, Turkish-Greek relations were once again 
tense, this time by developments in Cyprus. The agreement of the Greek Cypriots 
with Russia in January 1997, about the deployment of S-300 missiles brought 
attention to the region. With deployment of the missiles on the island, the balance 
in favor of Turkey would be demolished. It was not a situation acceptable for 
Ankara and harsh statements including warnings of use of force came in order to 
avoid deployment.274 In addition to Turkey’s opposition, it was not a favorable 
situation for the USA since existence of Russian missiles in the Mediterranean 
could serve Russian influence in the region. Turkish and American opposition 
prevented the deployment of the missiles in Cyprus by sending them to Crete. 
Even though the crisis ended in the way Turkey demanded, it was successful in 
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bringing attention of the global powers on Cyprus.275 The belief on the urgency of 
solution to the Cyprus issue which could be possible with the EU was 
strengthened.276 Like the Aegean disputes, the Cyprus issue also started to take 
part in the official documents of the EU concerning progress in Turkey-EU 
relations.  
Just like in the previous crises, after the Kardak/Imia and missile crises, 
Turkish and Greek leaders came together, this time in the Madrid Summit of 
NATO in July 1997 issuing a common declaration. Even though not binding for 
the parties, it was seen as an important step for the improvement of Turkish-Greek 
relations. In the declaration it was stated that “no threats of war or use of force 
[would] be made and that differences [would] be settled peacefully”.277 However, 
it was reflected by Greece in the international press as a retreat of Turkey rather 
than a common declaration. In his speech to Europe the Greek Foreign Affairs 
Undersecretary, Yannos Karanidiotis stated that “Turkey had accepted to abide by 
the international law and by international agreements as regards its relations with 
Greece. At the same time, Turkey had accepted to withdraw its threat of force 
against Greece”.278
 The Madrid declaration did not go beyond wishful thinking. The 
developments within the EU framework and reaching the peak of tension in 
Turkish-Greek relations in 1999 bore the same end as with the Bern negotiations of 
1976 and Davos process.  
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5.2.2.3. Big Disappointment: Agenda 2000 and Luxembourg Summit, 
December 1997 
The atmosphere of victory in Turkey created with the signing of Customs Union 
did not last long. Starting with Agenda 2000, the EU clearly put out the difference 
in the considerations of Turkey’s and Central and Eastern European countries 
progress on the way of membership.  
Agenda 2000 was prepared by the EU commission to determine a strategy 
for future enlargement of the Union and the necessary measures needed to be taken 
in order to end this process with success without damaging the strength and 
deepening of the Union.279 In the document, an assessment was made on the 
preparedness for membership of the ten Central and Eastern European applicant 
countries with Cyprus and it was recommended to start accession negotiations with 
six countries including Cyprus in early 1998.   
Regarding Turkey, the document did not specify either a candidacy or 
membership. In a separate part, the eligibility of the country for full membership 
was re-emphasized but also the deficiencies in democracy and human rights, need 
of civilian solution for the problems arising in Southeastern Turkey, solution of the 
Cyprus issue and settlement of disputes with Greece were pointed out.280 The 
‘exclusion’ of Turkey from the foreseen enlargement was not actually a total 
surprise. Before the preparation of Agenda 2000, the Turkish demand for getting 
candidacy status was expressed openly, but it faced negative attitude from the 
Union particularly from Germany. Because of the German general elections, the 
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Christian Democrats did not want to risk their success by opening the way for 
Turkey’s membership. This situation was stated explicitly by the German Prime 
Minister Helmut Kohl to Mesut Yilmaz, the Prime Minister in Turkey at that 
time.281  
While the voices questioning Turkey’s cultural differences, the attitude of 
Greece was noteworthy. Simitis’ new foreign policy opening started show in the 
attitude taken for Turkey-EU relations. In March 1997, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Theodoros Pangalos, who had had harsh expressions in previous years, 
showed his softened attitude with the words that “I object to the thesis that Turkey 
could not fit in the EU because of cultural differences. Turkey befits” and the 
subsequent leader of PASOK, George Papandreou, stated that he supported 
Turkey’s entry to the Union.282  
If an evaluation is to be made about the timing of the change in Greek 
expressions concerning Turkey-EU relations, it can be stated that this was perfect 
timing. When the attitude of supporting Turkey’s membership appeared on the 
Greek agenda, Aegean disputes had already started to take part in the Commission 
and Parliament reports and in the EU Council reports either under the title of 
Turkey as problems with Greece or border disputes. The policy of the Union was 
made clear in Agenda 2000 that “the border disputes of the candidate countries 
needed to be solved before membership status is gained”.283 The situation was 
even further ahead of the Cyprus issue. The promise for the start of accession 
negotiations of Cyprus taken in 1995 was clearly declared in Agenda 2000 without 
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requiring the need of a solution of disputes before membership. After then, the 
Cyprus issue was no longer under the monopoly of Turkish-Greek bilateral 
relations. Having disputes with a candidate country which would be incorporated 
in the Union within the first enlargement, EU was becoming the respondent of 
Turkey. Both in Aegean disputes and in the Cyprus issue the EU was not any 
longer at equal distance to Greece and Turkey.  
The disappointment of Turkey caused by Agenda 2000 was formalized in 
the Luxembourg Summit on 12 and 13 December 1997. The enlargement process 
was declared to start on 30 March 1998 for the ten Central and Eastern European 
countries and for Cyprus within a single framework, leaving Turkey out of the 
process. The situation of Turkey was expressed under the separate title of ‘A 
European Strategy for Turkey’, repeating Turkey’s eligibility for membership and 
an emphasis that Turkey would be judged on the basis of the same criteria as other 
applicant states.284 However, the Council also preferred to make an emphasis on 
the relations with Greece and Cyprus issue which were muddying the previous 
expression. It was stated that: 
(…) that strengthening Turkey’s links with the European Union also 
depends on (…) the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations 
between Greece and Turkey; settlement of disputes, in particular by 
legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support 
for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in 
Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. 
285  
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  This expression was important for the subsequent years of Turkey-EU and 
Turkish-Greek relations. The attitude of the EU on Aegean disputes and Cyprus 
issue was explicitly declared in the Presidency Council Conclusions of the Summit 
and emphasis was made on their resolution for the future of relations with Turkey. 
It can seen also as the official declaration of the EU that it was a part hereafter in 
those issues and would even be the main respondent in the following years. 
 The decisions of the Summit brought tough response from Turkey. The 
exclusion from the enlargement meant that “the doors of EU would be closed to 
Turkey for at least more than 20 years”.286 In addition to that, assessment on 
Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue and domestic politics in Turkey accelerated 
the toughness of Turkey’s response. On December 14th, the Turkish government 
declared that Turkey’s relations with the Union would continue within the context 
of Association Partnership, which did not include the political issues declared in 
the Summit conclusion, and the development of relations depended on the attitude 
of the Union in the future.287 While it was stated that Turkey would not continue 
its political dialogue concerning the stated issues, it was also declared that the 
integration process with the TRNC, which was development of economic 
integration and formation of a common defense doctrine, would be speeded up as a 
reaction to starting of Greek Cypriot accession negotiations on behalf of the whole 
island.288  
 The tough reaction of Turkey may have been effective in softening of the 
discourses of the EU in subsequent Summits about the improvement of the 
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European strategy to prepare Turkey for membership. However, in the final 
decision of the Helsinki Summit about giving Turkey candidacy status, there were 
other reasons more important than Turkey’s reactions.  
 
5.2.2.4. The Year 1999: Crisis, Pain and New Hopes 
On February 16, 1999, the attention of the international community but mostly of 
Turkey and Greece was focused on the crisis in Kenya. The event was the capture 
of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi by Turkish 
intelligence officials. The event brought a quake in domestic politics of Greece and 
shook its prestige in the international arena especially within the EU by explicitly 
putting out Greek support for terrorist activities in a neighboring country. Starting 
in the 1980s, with the policy of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, Greece had 
provided military, political and economic support for PKK and there had been 
sympathy established in Greek society for the “rebel Kurds” such that they pointed 
to similarities with their former situation and Greece’s independence in 1829.289  
 After the capture, Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos, Interior 
Minister Alekos Papadopoulos and Public Order Minister Philipos Petsalnikos 
were removed from office and the head of Greek intelligence resigned.290  These 
were the direct and immediate results of the capture which also meant for Simitis 
getting rid of the nationalist-populist staff of Papandreou who could not be 
dismissed before because of domestic political reasons.291  For the post of Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the son of Andreas Papandreou, George Papandreou, who had 
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always sided with Kostas Simitis in opposition from the very beginning, was 
assigned. This assignment was very important for the relations with Turkey. After 
the Öcalan crisis, the policy became to erase this event from memory with the 
moderate policies and closer relations, to establish a dialogue between the two 
countries and to draw the Turkish-Greek disputes within the European Union.292 
While the earthquake disaster in Turkey fastened this process, with the decision of 
the EU concerning Turkey’s status, a new period started in Turkish-Greek 
relations.  
 On August 17, 1999, Turkey lived one of the biggest disasters of its history.  
Causing great pain, economic and social problems and a new phenomenon in the 
lives of Turkish people, especially living in the Marmara region, the only positive 
outcome of it was the start of reconciliation between Turkish and Greek societies. 
Probably for the first time in their histories, Greek people were seeing on television 
Turks suffering.293 Among the first rescuers to arrive on the scene was the Greek 
search-and-rescue group.294 The civic movement in Greece to send more help to 
Turkey, the rescue of the Greek team of a boy alive from the rubble of an 
apartment, Turkish people’s applauses on the streets of the Greek rescuers during 
their drive to the airport to return home and headlines of newspapers prepared the 
necessary bases in Turkish and Greek communities for political rapprochement–a 
situation whose absence had resulted in the failure of the Davos Process. Just as 
expressed by Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou after the disaster, Greece 
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and Turkey had become spiritually much closer.295 The atmosphere established 
after the earthquake in Turkey was strengthened after the earthquake in Greece on 
September 7th, but this time Turkey running to help Greek people.  
It would not be wrong to state that the earthquakes created the necessary 
conditions in the societies for the success, at least continuation, of ‘Europeanized’ 
Greek policies towards Turkey. Ziya Onis states that: 
 (…) The recent Greek-Turkish rapprochement has an important 
romantic or idealistic dimension, marking the start of a new 
relationship based on mutual trust and co-operation, originating from 
civil initiatives in both countries and signaling the path through which 
co-operation could be built in the future. 296  
 
Like the Davos Process and even stronger, there was the intent in the 
political powers for improvement of relations. In the reflection of these politics to 
the other side, personal leadership of Papandreou and Cem cannot be denied. With 
existing public support, both politicians were able to hold olive branches tight. The 
intention of the politicians was immediately shown with Papandreou’s visit to 
Ankara in January 2000. During his visit, agreements on ‘soft issues’, “cooperation 
in fighting organized crime, in preventing illegal migration, in promoting tourism, 
and in protecting the environment” were signed.297  
Besides the reflections of reconciliation in bilateral relations in soft politics, 
there was change in the attitude of Greece within the EU in terms of financial 
issues. After the earthquake, “Greece partially lifted her veto on EU aid to 
Turkey”, which was a part of the Customs Union and vetoed by Greece because of 
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the Aegean disputes, without asking concessions.298 The peak of the transformed 
Greek policies came out in the Helsinki Summit. Among the most important 
decisions of the Summit was the grant of candidacy status to Turkey. It was stated 
in the Conclusions of the Summit that “Turkey is a candidate state destined to join 
the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate 
States”.299 In this decision not only the change in Greek attitude but also changes 
in other European countries, particularly in Germany, should be mentioned. In 
addition to general Greek foreign and domestic political aims stated before, the 
belief came over that “it would not be in a position to settle its (…) bilateral 
disputes with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea if Turkey was left isolated 
and outside the orbit of the European Union”.300 Bargaining power of Greece was 
directly related to Turkey’s will to be incorporated in the Union and favored 
solutions could be reached through European Union mediation. Besides the release 
of Greek veto, change in the political power in Germany and Washington’s 
pressure on the EU to keep Turkey close had a crucial effect on the decision 
taken.301 In addition to those reasons, after the Luxembourg disappointment, 
voices advocating the view that “Europe is an ethnic-religious club that will never 
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accept a country of 65 million Muslims” raised in Turkey.302 The discussions that 
Turkey should turn face its to Asia and develop relations with Eastern countries 
and Turkic republics increased. The EU policy of keeping Turkey at “arms length” 
seemed to lose effect and in order to get Turkey back into the mould a step was 
needed.  
In terms of Turkish-Greek relations, the decision included crucial points 
that were to affect the future of relations regarding Aegean Disputes and the 
Cyprus issue. In the document it was stated that:  
(…) like the other candidate States, [Turkey] will benefit from a pre-
accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will 
include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing 
towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular 
reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred 
to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a).”303
In the 4th paragraph, emphasis was on the peaceful settlement of 
outstanding disputes in accordance with the UN Charter. Within this condition, the 
Union calls for the candidate states to make every effort for resolutions. If the 
process fails, the Union promotes their settlement through the International Court 
of Justice at the latest by the end of 2004.304  In the paragraph 9(a) of the 
document, the Cyprus issue was mentioned.  It was stated that the talks started in 
New York under the auspices of the UN for a settlement of the Cyprus issue were 
supported by the Union.  
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As much as the decision of candidacy, those two paragraphs were important 
both for Turkey’s progress towards accession and in its relations with Greece. 
Starting with the document of Accession Partnership with Turkey, the Cyprus issue 
and Aegean disputes, namely border disputes, started to take place in the EU 
documents related to Turkey’s progress. The Helsinki Summit was the last step of 
transforming Turkish-Greek disputes into Turkey-EU disputes. Since then, Greece 
was the respondent of Turkey in the negotiations for settlement of disputes 
however; EU was the real respondent with sanction power holding the carrot-stick 
policy. At the peak of transformed Greek foreign policy of the 1990s, the Helsinki 
Summit was also proclaimed as ‘the end of history for Greece’ by Greek scholars 
such as Couloumbis and Tziampiris.305
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
305 Rumelili, 14.  
 113
  
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis aimed to analyze the Greek policies towards Turkey within the 
EU framework. It was particularly shaped around the question of how Greece’s EU 
membership was used in the bilateral relations with Turkey since the former 
became a full member of the Community until the candidacy status was given to 
Turkey in Helsinki, 1999. The outcomes of the analysis were presented in two 
main chapters reflecting different policies at different time periods, which were 
supported by two introductory chapters to provide basic information for a better 
understanding of the issues analyzed. 
By the end of the Second World War, Greece found itself surrounded by 
communist states while dealing with economic, social, and political problems 
inside because of the civil war. For the first decade in the Cold War period, the 
main Greek foreign and defense policy was to secure itself against an attack from 
communist neighbors. Consequently, it chose to become a member of NATO 
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along with Turkey. After NATO membership was achieved, Greece turned its face 
to the European Community (EC) with the same security considerations even 
though the Community did not have an entity to provide military security next to 
economic and particularly political reasons. At that time, Turkey did not take place 
among the reasons behind Greek policy of establishing closer relations with the 
EC. Instead, under the common threat of communism, both states lived a period of 
‘compulsory’ friendship. 
However, friendly relations did not last long after they secured themselves 
under the NATO umbrella, and closer relations were established with the EC and 
American assistance was felt on their shoulders. With the thaw in the Cold War 
during the 1970s, disputes came to the surface in bilateral relations to effect 
formation of their general foreign and defense policies in the following years. The 
Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 formed a turning point in Greek defense 
and foreign policies pointing out Turkey as the source of threat for the next two 
decades. With Aegean issues which appeared as ‘disputes’ on the agenda after the 
Cyprus intervention, dominated the bilateral relations, and simultaneously their 
respective relations with the EU.  
Among the reasons of Greece’s application for membership to the EC, 
Turkish threat took place next to other economic and political reasons under the 
broad slogan of Karamanlis, ‘We belong to West’. This situation was known 
commonly by all parties of the issue and it was also foreseen by the Community 
and Turkey that their relations might be affected by Greek membership. However, 
this possibility did not prevent the EC from taking steps for Greece’s integration 
and that came into effect in January 1981.  
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EC membership of Greece brought a new factor in Turkish-Greek relations. 
Being a member of an entity that Turkey has been trying to get in, gave Greece a 
big advantage strengthening its position in disputes with Turkey. However, the 
usage of EC/EU tool differed from the 1980s to the second half of the 1990s 
directly related to the change in PASOK administration. 
During the entire 1980s and early 1990s, Greece used its EC membership 
against Turkey as a veto tool in order to force Ankara to make concessions on 
disputed issues. While refusing to bring the Ankara Agreement within its borders, 
the main Greek vetoes came on the Association Council meetings regarding 
Turkey and on financial packages. During this period, the EC did not make 
declarations about the way the Cyprus issue as well as Aegean disputes should be 
solved avoiding taking side in Turkish-Greek relations. The Greek veto was used 
by the Community to reflect Greece as the main obstacle on the development of 
relations with Turkey. Greece also had the advantages of this policy since it was 
increasing its bargaining power against Turkey.  
However, this policy left its place to more constructive policies with 
Simitis’ premiership in Greece starting in 1996. In the transformed policies EC 
membership continued to be an important card in Greece’s hands but now as a 
‘carrot’ more than a ‘stick’. This was a policy not only towards Turkey, but also 
towards the Balkan countries under the new role Greece shouldered for the 
stabilization of the region, which was to coach them to NATO and EU 
memberships as being the only Balkan country holding those titles in the second 
half of the 1990s. In terms of the usage of EC membership as a ‘carrot’ vis-à-vis 
Turkey, Greece started to express its will for Turkey’s integration with the EU. 
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This policy of Simitis was closely related with his macro economy-politics. In 
order to be included in the euro zone, there was an urgent need to curtail military 
expenditures of the country to reach the targets set by the Community. And this 
curtailment was related with relations with Turkey since Ankara had been 
perceived as the main threat to the country. In addition to the economic goals of 
Simitis, the attitude of the EU about Cyprus issue and the Aegean disputes started 
to change. In 1995, the start of accession negotiations of Cyprus was guaranteed as 
a response to lifting the Greek veto on Customs Union with Turkey. By this way, 
the main step to make Cyprus a problem of the EU was taken. Besides, after the 
Kardak/Imia crisis, the Commission took the attitude of supporting Greece’s 
arguments and solutions for the Aegean disputes.  Since then, both Cyprus and 
Aegean disputes started to take place in the official documents of the Union 
concerning relations with Turkey. The last step bringing the direct involvement of 
the Union into Turkish-Greek disputes was taken in the Helsinki Summit with the 
granting of candidacy status to Turkey with  the caveat of correlating the solution 
of the Cyprus issue and settlement of border disputes with Greece, namely Aegean 
disputes with progress of Turkey on the way of membership. After transforming 
the Aegean disputes into steps needed to be taken according to criteria set by the 
EU, Greece now takes place among the stronger supporters of Turkey’s 
membership to the Club. 
 Eventually, Greece was successful in Europeanization of its disputes with 
Turkey before the end of the 1990s. It was a clear diplomacy success of Simitis. 
Taking the disputes within the framework of the EU, Greece made the Community 
the main respondent of Turkey. This diplomacy brought Greece the bargaining 
 117
power which it would not have alone regarding it relative economic and political 
power. This diplomacy not only relieved Greece in terms of disputes with Turkey 
but also erased the label of ‘spoiled child of Europe’ and brought it close to core 
states of the Union.  
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